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ANNOTATION 
 
The lack of researches, concentrating on identifying urban features that can be associated with target selection 
by terrorists, determined thesis overriding question and goal, identify environmental security design elements, 
as well as spatial urban structures that can possible influence choice of places for terror attacks. To 
accomplish main goal, some prerequisite goals have been taken into account.  
Initially, a brief history of terrorism and anti-terrorism design with number of examples and cases have been 
analyzed and assessed, where some sophisticated security design principles have been highlighted. For 
humanizing ant-terrorism design elements, crime prevention strategies have been explored, ending with a 
basic principle of urban and civic design.  
Second Chapter of a thesis, researches environmental design factors and spatial urban structures that may 
influence the choice of places for terror attacks. Findings have reviled the chance of terror attack is high when 
‘site has a direct access to the main street’; when ‘there are multiple entrances and exits to and from the site’; 
when ‘site is well-used’; when ‘public and private activities are separated’; when ‘many same functional 
buildings are redistributed in a surrounding area’; when ‘site has a direct access to the city center’. On the 
contrary, chance of terror attack is low when ‘vehicle access point to the building is minimalized’; when 
‘medical institution is presented nearby the site’ when ‘Access to private and public space is clearly defined’. 
Research also pointed out that, globally integrated roads turning sites into a vulnerable and attractive target 
for terrorists. 
Final Chapter of thesis, describes experimental project that has a theoretical, as well as field research results 
background, implemented into Tbilisi railway station and its surrounded site. Proposed design solutions show 
that security design can be transparent or in better case even invisible to public eyes. A thesis proposes that 
cooperation between security design and good urban design will turn existing railway station into a desirable 
and at the same time safe public space for the city. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Terrorism; Anti-terrorism design; Counterterrorism; CPTED; Crime prevention; 
Environmental Criminology; Urban planning; Civic Design; ‘Invisible Security’; Space Syntax.  
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GLOSSARY  OF  KEY  TERMS 
 
 
Continues surveillance The process of continues observation of a place, person 
(suspect) with help of technological devises. For instance, 
with CCTV cameras.  
Cul-de-sac roads The street with dead-end. 
Correlation A bilateral relation of two or more things, objects, elements 
and etc.  
CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. 
Dependent variable Dependent variable, relays on independent variable. “(It is) 
what you measure in the experiment and what is affected 
during experiment” (NC State University).  
  
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Independent variable The variable that can be controlled. “It is usually what you 
think will affect the dependent variable” (NC State 
University). 
NCTCO National Counter Terrorism Security Office. 
Natural surveillance The process of continues observation of a place, person 
(suspect) by people itself. For instance, by police forces or 
by residents.  
Regression analysis A statistical process of analysing relation between 
variables. It comprises various techniques and methods for 
estimating different variables (Wikipedia). 
Space syntax(SS) A term that comprises various theories and techniques in 
search on analysing spatial urban structures (Wikipedia).  
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Standoff distance A security measurement for distance between vulnerable 
target object and potential threat.  
SPSS  Statistical Package for Social Sciences. 
 
Variable “A characteristic, number, or quantity that increases or 
decreases over time, or takes different values in different 
situations” (Business Dictionary). 
 
‘eyes on the street’ theory Jane Jacobs theory, that tries to prove that populated sites 
are less likely affected by criminal activities with help of 
natural surveillance. (Jacobs, 1961)  
  
 
  
6 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Annotation ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Glossary of key terms .................................................................................................................... 4 
Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 1 Literature review on security design and placemaking .................................... 15 
1.1 Terrorism in Urban Design practice .................................................................................... 16 
1.1.1. History, definition of terrorism and, city as a product of security design .................... 16 
1.1.2. Impact of terrorism on urban forms and high risk urban areas .................................... 19 
1.1.3. Anti-terrorism design implementation, its pros and cons and impact on the built 
environment ................................................................................................................................. 22 
1.1.4. Security planning Trends for terror-resistant cities ...................................................... 25 
1.1.4.1. Major site-specific security design principles ....................................................... 26 
1.1.4.2. Anti-terrorism design guidelines for increasing security on the site ..................... 28 
1.1.4.3. Aesthetics of Anti-terrorism design and ‘invisible’ security ................................ 36 
1.2. Place based crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) principles and 
practices: ......................................................................................................................................... 41 
1.2.1. First and second-generation Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
definition and history; ................................................................................................................. 41 
1.2.2. First and second-generation crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) 
Principles and strategies .............................................................................................................. 45 
1.3.  Placemaking Principles ........................................................................................................... 50 
1.3.1.  Main urban design principles ........................................................................................... 50 
1.3.2. Civic design and its relevance to security design principles ............................................. 51 
Hypothetical model ...................................................................................................................... 54 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 59 
CHAPTER 2 Empirical research for identifying environmental features and spatial urban 
structures for anti-terrorism design .......................................................................................... 61 
2.1. Hypothesis and methodology for selected case studies: ...................................................... 62 
2.1.1. Research hypotheses formed by anti-terrorism design and CPTED principles............ 62 
2.1.2. Empirical research methodology .................................................................................. 64 
2.1.3. Case studies and research objects ................................................................................. 66 
2.2.  Research on environmental design (CPTED) features influencing choice of places for terror 
attacks: ............................................................................................................................................ 74 
7 
 
2.2.1.  Questionnaire based research process .............................................................................. 74 
2.2.2. Results from data correlation analysis .......................................................................... 77 
2.2.3. Results from comparative analysis and descriptive statistics............................................ 81 
2.3. Research on spatial urban structure factors that influence choice of places for terror attacks: 84 
2.3.1. Process of syntactical analysis .......................................................................................... 84 
2.3.2. Results from space syntax analysis ................................................................................... 86 
2.4. Prognosis, main findings, and recommendations: ................................................................... 89 
2.4.1.  Prognosis model of the place choice for terror attacks, based on logistic regression 
analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 89 
2.4.2. Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 91 
Conceptual model ........................................................................................................................ 93 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 96 
CHAPTER 3 Experimental project for anti-terrorism design interventions in Tbilisi central 
railway station case ...................................................................................................................... 98 
3.1. Background information and factors influencing design processes: ....................................... 99 
3.1.1. Target object selection for experimental design ............................................................... 99 
3.1.2. City infrastructural reorganization and public transport mobility on the site ................. 102 
3.1.3. Irregular Parking lots ....................................................................................................... 107 
3.1.4. Destination of shopping .................................................................................................. 108 
3.1.5. Community context and urban life .................................................................................. 110 
3.2. Research on the data necessary for design:............................................................................ 111 
3.2.1. Methodology of acquiring relevant information for design feature implementation ...... 111 
3.2.2. Results from site quantitative research............................................................................ 112 
3.2.3. Tbilisi historical layers and railway station site formation ............................................. 114 
3.2.4. Zoning and existing situation analysis ............................................................................ 117 
3.3. Conceptual approach to the issue of Railway Station reinforcement and design 
implementations: ........................................................................................................................... 118 
3.3.1.  Civic, urban design, CPTED and Anti-Terrorism design principles and the ways of 
consideration into railway station case...................................................................................... 118 
3.3.2.  Main Conceptual approach and strategies ...................................................................... 125 
3.3.3. Design Process and justification of design solutions ...................................................... 129 
3.3.4. Suggestion for surrounding land use development and changes in zoning plane ........... 136 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 138 
Whole work conclusions ............................................................................................................ 141 
Summary .................................................................................................................................... 145 
8 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 147 
Annexies ...................................................................................................................................... 155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A frequency of terrorism cases in a spatial configuration that strongly affects urban forms, as well as 
architecture sustainability, leads to death of a vast number of civilians following sense of insecurity, 
has highlighted a new obstacle for urban planners and architects, planning cities for meeting new 
standards of security against natural as well as manmade disasters. 
According to some scholars, “contemporary security as a concept, practice and commodity is 
undergoing a rescaling, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, with previously international 
security concerns penetrating all levels of governance. Security is becoming more civic, urban, 
domestic, and personal: security is coming home” (Coaffee and Wood, 2006). 
The importance of security is also determined by a significant number of recent terror attacks and 
mass violence that has had a disastrous impact on existing urban forms. The venue of terror attacks 
has moved from developing to developed countries that has already experienced number of attacks 
in a last few decades. According to this fact, insecurity has turned into a harmful hazard for most 
European cities. Existing urban polices in most cases do not meet security standards and guidelines 
for all the countries in the world (Matijosaitiene, Petriashvili 2017). Necessity of implementation of 
new environmental standards, as well as equipping major buildings in a high-risk urban area with 
elements against manmade disasters, has turned into essential factor for 21st century design. Some 
scholars claim that, “terrorism is becoming more local and (that) civilian’s targets are being 
threatened by acts of mass violence” (Coaffee, 2009), whereas in fact, nowadays, urban planners are 
not very familiar with principles of security design. In addition, there is no significant attempts of 
cooperation between planners, municipality, governmental, regional structures as well as civilians 
for planning secured and pleasant environment.  
Actuality and relevance of the field of security and anti-terrorism design is vivid after looking 
through cities as products of a security design. Furthermore, disastrous impact on urban forms, 
caused by terror attacks, as well as anti-terrorism design strategies, arising various social issues, 
outlined a significance and relevance of carrying out a deep research for farther investigating anti-
terrorism design principles.  
For highlighting necessity of security, the thesis starts with analysing medieval ‘fortressed’ cities, 
ending with urbanized, contemporary capitals. “Historically, the link between cities and mass 
violence is strong and complex” (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). Consequently, medieval fortresses had 
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been erected in order to create a safe ‘harbor effect’(Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). It is worth to 
mention that “violence (makes) travel difficult and increases the advantage of proximity” (Glaeser 
and Shapiro, 2001). Urban sprawl can be understood as one of the main determinant factor for 21st 
century city development, leading to urban clusters, isolated from city cores and developing 
independently. These circumstances, make it harder to fortify contemporary cities inside a 
“medieval fortresses”. Although, some scholars state that it is better to be in a city than outside the 
borders of the town, as far as the role of city is to protect its residents against any violence activities 
(Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001), as for Pirenne, he sees origins of European cities in “fortified cities, 
erected by the feudal princes to provide shelter for their men” (Pirenne, 1936). Meanwhile, Bloch 
points out that “disorders of the early middle ages had in many cases induced men to draw nearer to 
each other” (Bloch, 1961). Nowadays a significance of ‘invisible’ security implementation has been 
outlined in many anti-terrorism design strategies. ‘London Ring of the steel’, the Great Britain 
solution of downtown surveillance is one of those. However, this excellent example of 
‘experimental traffic scheme’ has its cons.  A project faces up some social problems. While a visible 
police force prove protection against any violence actions, “it can also unintentionally frighten 
civilians away from downtowns”  (Rothrock, 2010). Taking into consideration social aspects and the 
necessity of ‘invisible’ security, some scholars have argued the importance of the increased 
consideration of aesthetics in anti-terrorism and security design. To make matters worse, according 
to Blieker while security threats are becoming complex, our understanding and methods of 
providing security for city dwellers are out of date (Bleiker 2006).  
As has been discussed before, topic has a historical background. Number of theoretical, social, and 
practical issues remain unobserved. This circumstance, highlights the relevance of investigating and 
solving security and anti-terrorism design issues to better suit 21st century urban patterns.  
Main goal of a thesis is to identify environmental elements and urban design features that can be a 
potential determinant factor for choosing a specific site for terror attack, while avoiding others. 
Following this, thesis work aims to develop aesthetically pleasant experimental design solutions for 
terrorism resilient cities. 
Main tasks of a thesis work are following:  
1) identify high risk urban areas that are more likely turning into venues of terror attacks; 
2) carry out analysis for identifying environmental features that could be a determinant factor 
for choosing particular area for attacks while avoiding others and draw prognoses for 
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identifying major variables (urban features) that will therefore provide some insights on the 
future analysis of terrorism targets, through urban planning factors.  
3) identify spatial urban structures that can have a potential impact on site’s vulnerability rate; 
4) develop conceptual approach to the issue, while proving that consideration of anti-terrorism 
in relation of CPTED, civic and urban design principles, will lead to aesthetically pleasant, 
accessible, and safe environmental for site users. 
5) check findings reasonableness with experimental design project of Tbilisi Railway station 
while implementing guidelines and principles, acquired from literature analysis related to 
Anti-terrorism design, CPTED, urban and civic design principles as well as from field 
research. 
Research Objects for first part of empirical field research (questioner based research) are cities, that 
has recently been venues of terror attacks. Decision was made on sites, affected by suicide bombing, 
mass shooting, and car bombing. Research objects are following:   
• Brussel (Maalbeek station); 
• Liege (Saint lambert Square);  
• Oslo (Governmental headquarter);  
• Paris (Stadium of France “Stade de France”);  
• Paris (Boulvard Voltaire); 
• Volgograd (Trolleybus);  
• Diyarbakir (Governmental offices); 
• Stockholm (City Conference hall);  
• Ankara (Central railway station; Bus stop, Military headquarter); 
• Ankara (Bus stop); 
• Ankara (Military headquarter); 
• Istanbul (Istiklal avenue); 
• Istanbul (Sultan Ahmet district);  
• Tel-Av-Iv (Small businesses).  
According to characteristic of questioner based research, some sites without terror attacks (in same 
cities, presented above) has also taken into account.  
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Second half of a research part, aims to carry out a large-scale territory analysis for cities, recently 
been affected by terror attacks. Selection was made on following sites: 
• Ankara 2015, October (G. Mustafa Kemal boulevard); 
• Ankara 2016, February (Turkish military headquarter);  
• Ankara 2016, March (Ataturk boulevard); 
• Brussels 2016 (Maelbeek Metro station);  
• Istanbul 2016 (Istiklal avenue);  
• Tel-Av-Iv 2016 (Dizengoff street).  
Turning into a thesis target object. In order to implement and tests findings reasonableness from 
previous researches, a real problematic urban area, Tbilisi central railway station and its surrounding 
territory has been selected. A chosen site is located in Tbilisi, a capital city of Georgia. Selected 
urban complex, comprises some valuable public buildings, residential areas, shopping centers, 
museum, main public transport stops and etc.  
There have been various methods and relevant tools used in search of developing thesis work, 
broadening knowledge in the field of security design, experimenting hypotheses with help of a field 
research and implementing findings into experimental project.  
First part of a thesis, comprising reviewing literature with help of analysing widely-studied and 
researched papers, books, conferences, and lectures, related to anti-terrorism design CPTED, urban 
and civic design principles. As a main tool of this chapter could be foreseen various researches, 
books and articles with related topics. Federal Emergency Management Agency guidelines and 
RIBA anti-terrorism design principles are foreseen as main confessed references for thesis work 
while talking about anti-terrorism design principles.  
The main part of a thesis is empirical field research on environmental design features that could be a 
possible determinant factor for turning a specific area into venue of terror attacks. In order to acquire 
precise results, research has been carried out in two ways. For identifying specific urban elements on 
a site scale, ‘Yes/No’ questioner has been developed based on CPTED checklist and with 
considering FEMA guidelines for anti-terrorism design principles. The information for filling in a 
questioner, has been obtained from aerial pictures of specific sites. Tool, that has been used for 
acquiring necessary data, is the following: Google Earth Pro for identifying existing program on 
sites, as well as various articles, from which relevant information about attacks has been gathered. In 
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the end, SPSS software was implemented for identifying results from ‘Yes/No’ questioner, find 
correlation between urban elements, highlight variables with descriptive statistics and draw 
prognoses for experimental project design. Correlation analysis is used to identify relations between 
terror attack and urban elements, and automatic regression is used to make the prediction model for 
terror attacks 
As for the second part of a field research that aims to investigate spatial features with help of site’s 
larger scale analysis. Research has carried out with help of space syntax method (SS). As a research 
tool, DepthMap software is used for analysing following site attributes: integration, choice, 
connectivity, and mean depth of different areas. Methods will be discussed further in Chapter 2 of a 
thesis work.  
Experimental project is the last phase of a thesis. It aims to integrate various tools and skills 
acquired from literature analysis related to terrorism, CPTED , urban design and civic design 
principles and real experiences from cities affected by terror attacks. In other words, experimental 
design considers findings from hypothetical model developed by literature review as well as from 
empirical research conceptual model for identifying urban features that have a possible relation with 
terror attacks. 
Methods that has been used for developing experimental project for terrorism resilient cities are 
various. Thesis used space syntax method, in order to identify most vulnerable target objects in 
Tbilisi. As for acquiring information for site analysis, research used various sources, such are: 
National Statistics Office of Georgia (Geostat), Tbilisi Transport Company, Tbilisi City hall and 
National Archives of Georgia.  
Turning into a Structure of a Master Thesis, the work is divided into three main chapters, Chapter 1 
gives a general overview on already existing principles and guidelines for anti-terrorism design, 
CPTED, urban and civic design, analyzed by various scholars. Consequently, it comprises three 
sections. First section, dedicates to anti-terrorism design, its history, principles, and strategies. 
Moreover, this part highlights the importance of ‘invisible’ security, as well as the necessity of 
cooperation between different institutions with civilians who are actually users of the space. Section 
2 suggests an overview on crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies. 
Section 3 describes the process of placemaking, and highlights important elements that in the end 
will irreversible create a desirable place for site users. This section, outlines the importance of 
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cooperating between citizens, who directly affected by the problem, urban planners, who need to 
solve the problem, governmental organizations, that need to see the problem. 
In the end of the chapter a hypothetical model is described, that is therefore a theoretical result of 
literature review.  
Chapter 2, describes the process of empirical research in search of identifying environmental 
features and spatial urban structures that can be determinant factors for turning sites into vulnerable 
targets for terrorists. First section of the chapter, clarifies field research methodology and analyses 
of selected sites for carrying out a research. Second section describes the process of evaluating site 
specific features with help of CPTED checklist questioner, as for third section, it comprises process 
of syntactical analysis of sites, affected by terror attacks and its results. Forth section, gives 
recommendations and building up prognoses model for some variables (environmental features). In 
the end of this chapter a conceptual model and conclusions are formed.  
Chapter 3 is a report of experimental project design process and its results. It starts with describing 
well-augmented design object selection. This chapter comprises four sections. First section describes 
factors influencing design process; a qualitative research on site existing situation by analysing 
mobility, community context, urban life, shopping, parking on the site, and etc. Second section is 
related to quantitative as well as qualitative research necessary for design. In this section, design 
project boundaries are outlined. Third section draws strategical approaches for organizing railway 
station site in search of turning it into less vulnerable target for any possible attacks. As for final 
section, it describes the process of a design. 
Thesis ends with whole work conclusions.  
Intention of a thesis work, is to encourage urban and city planners, designers, and architects to 
consider safety measures in their initial projects, as far as it is much easier to mitigate and deter 
potential risk in a basic stage of design process.  
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1.1 Terrorism in Urban Design practice 
 
1.1.1. History, definition of terrorism and, city as a product of security design 
 
Starting with explaining “The term “Terror”, (that) comes from the Latin word “Terrere”, which 
means “Frighten “or “tremble” The definition of terrorism varies over time and among agencies.” 
(Matusitz, 2013) “It has also been described variously as both tactic and strategy, a crime and a holy 
duty” (Arowolo, 2013). According to Jeffrey studies, there are more than 212 definitions of 
terrorism exist across the world. (Jeffrey 2003) Consequently, thesis will use universally accepted 
definition: “Terrorism is the use of violence to create fear for political, religious, or ideological 
reasons” (International terrorism and security research). “The terror is intentionally aimed at 
noncombatant targets such as civilians or iconic symbols” and the objects that are valuable for 
country or nation in search of achieving the greatest attention from international publicity (Matusitz, 
2013).   
According to Zalman: “the history of terrorism is as old as human’s willingness to use violence to 
affect politics” (Zalman 2016). It is relevant to mention that the first fact of terrorism dates back to 
1st century AD. and associated with Zealots of Judea (Sicari), a politically motivated Jewish group, 
that aimed to murder enemies in order to push aside their Roman ruler from Judea. (Zalman 2016). 
As for modern terrorism, it has started in 1793 by Maximilien Robespierre, following the French 
revolution. His main motives were to transform monarchy to liberal democracy. Consequently, in 
18th century, it was quite common to use terrorism as a violent tool against existing political regime. 
Another refractive era in terrorism history starts in the middle of 20th century with the name on non-
state terrorism influenced by the ideologies of nationalism and communism. In doing so, terrorist 
organizations have spread all over the world. During this time, suicide bombing and other tactics for 
achieving their goals were quite popular.  
Terrorism, has turned more global only in the late of 20th century, when hijacking becomes a 
popular tactic of attack. This can be clarified by number of cases. For instance: an attack on El Al 
flight and 1983the bombing of a Pan Am flight by Liberation of Palestine in 1963. Among other 
terrifying events of this period 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, a politically motivated attack 
could be understood as a successful achievement of Palestinian terrorists that followed with 
international attention to their national causes. According to Naftali, Munich case was the main 
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determinant factor that “the term counterterrorism and international terrorism formally entered the 
Washington political lexicon.” (Naftali 2005) As for 21st century, terrorism acquired other 
motivations rather than politics.  
Throughout centuries, cities have been formed in a way, to provide safety and security to its 
dwellers. Although, it has been achieved in different ways and methods. Consequently, it is relevant 
to state that medieval cities pattern had been mainly a product of safety, created by citizens itself. 
According to this, it is not a surprising fact, that the “most important, interaction between warfare 
and urban development is that historically cities have provided protection against land-based 
attackers. Cities have the duel advantages of large numbers and walls and thus, holding the size of 
the attack constant, it is much better to be in a city than alone in the hinterland” (Glaeser and 
Shapiro 2001). A clarification of this principle could be seen in medieval cities and settlements 
urban patterns. City inside a barrier that was presented by strong fortifications, a tactic decision on 
location of settlements on hills, on high mountains, cities surrounded by the moat, and etc. Inside the 
city, vulnerable architectural objects like castles were surrounded by walls or moats as protective 
elements. A significant fact of medieval city planning that can be seen in modern secured city 
patterns, was the fact that “irregular pattern in planning was devised to confuse enemies, as enemies 
were unfamiliar with town” (Gutjahr, 1999). A relevant example here could be city Mount St. 
Michele in France, that was enclosed within a protective wall and water surrounded the whole 
complex. However, example of city of Rome should be mentioned as an illustration of how violence 
directly impacted on urban forms in fortified medieval cities. After numerous attacks of Visigoth 
leader Alaric I, the population of Rome has dropped over 1 million in the year 210 to approximately 
35 000 at the beginning of the middle ages (World Population Review). “Continuing attacks to the 
city has shown that living outside the Rome was safer than inside the city itself “(Glaeser and 
Shaparo, 2002).  
Turning into cities from middle ages (12-13th centuries), when population grew immensely city still 
kept on developing inside a fortified wall and filling in open spaces. This circumstance caused 
number of issues from which most common problem was lack of hygiene. “The walled cities 
represented protection from direct assault at the price of corporate interference on the pettiest levels, 
but once a townsman left the city walls, was at the mercy of often violence in the countryside” 
(Guelph University, bibliography The Medieval City). this was mainly caused by the lack of polices 
to defend citizens outside protected city walls. Consequently, it is relevant to state that one of the 
main attractions of city centers (major city cores, remains from middle ages) is that, they provide a 
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safer environment and are better equipped to defend themselves. For defending this statement some 
scholars argued that “the power of massed numbers in itself gave the city a superiority over the 
thinly populated widely scattered villages, and served as an incentive to farther growth” (Mumford, 
1960). Although, high density in cities and a concentration of population on one specific areas tend 
to create an attractive target for mass violence with a significant result. “Consequently cities, have 
always been an attractive target of terrorists” (Matijosaitiene and Petriashvili, 2017). 
If earlier cities used to have only valuable buildings protected against any violence, medieval 
dwellings from 12-15th centuries foreseen as individual fortresses. However, in fact, first 
independent fortifications for particular houses have been found in Mestia municipality, located in 
country Georgia, dates back to 8-9th centuries. Each household has its own tower for protection 
against any possible attacks. 
Turning into new era of city planning (16th-18th centuries),number of questions have arised: “Must 
the wall be torn down? Must the armor be removed? Or did the civilization have the capacity to 
continue growth from its own center and so to arrive without disintegration, at a wider synthesis?” 
(Mumford, 1961). It is vivid that with new era, new perceptions and new ideas of security has been 
developed and implemented into city planning. According to Ashworth, in Renaissance period, 
when warfare has become an important aspect to consider in planning cities, a necessity of urban 
defense has been introduced, highlighting ineffectiveness of medieval fortification (Asworth 1991) 
There was a statement that 14th century city fortifications, moats or cities situated on inaccessible 
hills were turning the sites more vulnerable. “ (Mumford, 1961). According to this fact, 
“Renaissance urban design have become a matter of elaborate fortifications and city security have 
become a duty for military” (Wyly, 2012). 
Following with, 19th century, city planners and architect’s major duty was to deal with problems, 
such as fastest growing population, that on itself led to problems of public health. This circumstance 
caused changes in street width and building height regulations, however it was not related to 
security design. Meanwhile in American villages, locals used to build homes in the center of their 
land (first attempt of maximizing standoff distance). According to this “In the American west, 
property was much more secure than in medieval Europe” (Glaeser and Shaparo, 2002). Although, 
this should not be the only reason, there was number of factors. For instance, easy connection of 
rural areas to major cities with organized highways. In addition to this, better transportation made 
social interaction possible despite isolated location as well as the size of farmlands.  
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A significant fact for this century could be a popularity of vast migration of workers from rural to 
urban areas. This circumstance led to large, dense population, having a direct impact on form of the 
cities and how cities are planned. “Dense cities lend themselves to having tall buildings, subway 
system and other planned infrastructure to support the population” (Giuseppe, 2012), this 
infrastructure itself required more protection against manmade disasters. According to Glaeser, 
technological revolution made a few chances for an individuals to achieve a great amount of 
causalities “Today, relatively few individuals can do a significant amount of harm to much larger 
group (Glaeser, Shapiro 2002) whereas in fact in the past a single warrior could do more than 
committee a suicide. However, number of examples mentioned in following chapters put Glaeser 
opinion under doubt.  
To sum up we can deduce that cities will always be a target of mass violence. Larger cities are more 
desirable targets for terrorists as far as high density means that there is high concentration of 
resources that can be affected by violence (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). “In the past marauders, 
raiders, wars, and pillaging affected urban forms, nowadays it has given a new universal name - 
terrorism” (Giuseppe, 2013).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2. Impact of terrorism on urban forms and high risk urban areas 
 
As far as it has been agreed that universal name of mass violence could be ‘terrorism’, it would be 
relevant to discuss terrorism as a social and physical impacts of 21st century cities. According to 
what has been mentioned before, it is right to point out that terrorism can have a significant impact 
on both human welfare, as well as specific countries economic prosperity.  
Major impacts of terrorism can be classified in the following four categories: 
• human impact: impacts on human’s well-being (psychological, health); 
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• economic impact: for carrying out rehabilitation processes;  
• public confidence: impact on changes in public behavior;  
• government functionality (Glaeser et al, 2001). 
All the four factors have a strong relation with each other, if any of them fails all the rest will fail 
automatically.  
A vivid example of how terror attack, affected psychological aspect of society, could be found in 
Norway. ‘Regjeringskvartalet’ a governmental headquarter in Oslo, has been attacked in 2011. Even 
though there was a lot of ideas of how to regain ‘power ‘and valuable properties of a districts, 
almost half of employees rejected returning to their working places. (Paizs, 2013) 
“If this diversity seems obvious when you look at Regjeringskvartalet, this is not what the 
Norwegian people express when they talk about it. To them, this district formerly a symbol of power 
is now a wound in their History…The Government Quarter became a place of gathering and 
remembrance. Time seems to have stopped then and there.” (Guillot, L. 2013) 
Turning into a high risk urban areas, it has been widely agreed that a significant concentration of 
civilians in a small land turns the place into an attractive venue for terror attacks. However, “Current 
practices have stayed away from this form of thinking, as the geography of terrorism has widened 
and there are more potential targets through urban areas which were traditionally not targeted” 
(Coeffee, 2009). High risk urban areas can be created either by the importance of the place leading 
to crowded places or by the activities takes place in it (political, religious, transportation, touristic 
attraction, and etc.). British government has number of publications claiming the danger of 
international terrorist in public areas.  HM government defines a crowded place as a ”…location or 
environment to which members of the public have access that may be considered potentially liable 
to terrorist attack by virtue of its crowd density” (HM Government, 2010). According to HM 
government, crowded places include: transportation hubs, sport stadiums, pubs/clubs/bars, shopping 
centers/shopping streets, tourist attraction spots; cinemas/theatres, commercial centers, business 
centers. Crowded places can also comprise public realm such are parks and squares. Crowded places 
can be subdivided by its physical attributes: permanent and temporary places. Permanent places can 
be outdoor or indoor venues. As for temporary places, it can be temporary ticketed event venues or 
open access events like parades or street exhibitions (HM Government 2010). This statement can be 
clarified by significant British attacks history, 1975 bombing of London hotels and restaurants, 1991 
Victoria station bombing following with 1992 bombing of London Bridge station, 2005 London 
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subway bombing and 2007 an attempt to bomb popular nightclub. However, it is just a minor list of 
attacks that took place in one of the most developed European cities. 
While listing potential targets for terrorists, governmental and military installations, embassies, and 
etc. are in most cases belong to different group, so called ‘hard targets’. It has been proved that 
terrorists, in most cases avoid attacking ‘fortified’ objects and instead choosing ‘soft targets’ were 
the probable success of attack is quite high, following with a high number of causalities and 
international publicity accordingly. It is significant to be mentioned that so called ‘soft’ targets have 
rarely been a target for mass violence (Coaffee, 2009). However, technological innovation, and 
number of terror attacks has highlighted the need to put a greater emphasis on a range of traditional 
and nontraditional targets. 
Mumbai attack in 2008 is a clear example of ‘soft’ target attack with a little effort and simple tactics. 
Another determinant of success in Mumbai attack was that, public transportation was easily 
accessed by terrorists, and a significant concentration of population in a Mumbai train station turned 
into an ideal killing zone. Even though Mumbai 2008 attack aimed on other targets groups (to kill 
foreigners), train station calculated more than third of the total deaths. (Jenkinson, 2009).  After a 
Mumbai attack Brian Michel Jenkinson highlighted the idea of terrorist motives: “Terrorism will 
continue to focus on soft targets that offer high body counts and that have iconic value. Nationally 
and internationally recognized venues that offer ease of access, certainty of tactical success, and the 
opportunity to kill in quantity will guide target selection. Public spaces are inherently difficult to 
protect” (Jenkinson, 2009). Transportation facilities have always been an attractive target for 
aggressors, if city walls ensuring safety of city dwellers inside immense fortifications, commuting 
from one city to another was dangerous (Glaser, Shapiro, 2002). Same threats, but in different scales 
can be seen in contemporary urban environment. However, in some cases transportation instead of 
being a main target of attack has been used as a weapon of attacking something more valuable. A 
good illustration here could be 9/11 attack on New York world trade center by hijacking airplane.  
It is quite common theoretically approved approach that if we devalue importance of places it is 
possible to avoid potential risks, it is a “process of making the site or building of little to no value or 
consequence” (FEMA, 2003). The main idea behind devaluing important buildings is that, there will 
be less chance to be targeted. (Pawley, 1998).  
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1.1.3. Anti-terrorism design implementation, its pros and cons and impact on the built 
environment 
 
It is inclined to believe that any design interaction in already adapted human habitats that on itself 
leads to dramatic environmental changes has always been a reason of evolution in human behaviors. 
Sometimes behaviors responded negatively and in a rare case positively. Ellin in her article Fear 
and City Buildings describes formation of fear caused by architecture itself and how this architecture 
is affecting characteristic features of the city. Ellin clams that “most of what was built after the war 
in both the United States and Western Europe: isolated towers, slabs and unending blocks in search 
of diminishing sense of fear…has destroyed the image of the city, apart from this the rising tide of 
fear has transformed most public areas into controlled and guarded places.” (Elin. 2001) while 
“security features at some sites are expected to be (tedious) and obtrusive, at other sites invisible, 
security is required to help such defensive measures to become acceptable to the public” (Coaffee et 
al, 2006), whereas in fact some scholars state that “the main rule of security is to make target 
inconspicuous, so any uniqueness of appearance or under prominence in a building will immediately 
be ruled out” (Pawley 1998). Those attitudes toward architecture, without considering social aspects 
leads design to so called ‘Architecture of Fear’ (Ellin, 1997). Other part of researchers could give it 
another name such as ‘visible security’(Coaffee, et al 2009), both of them can be understood as a 
problem as soon as they appear in urban forms. Consequently, implementing anti-terrorism design 
principles into contemporary urban landscape in a more sensitive way rises the importance and 
relevance of this thesis paper. Even though, anti-terrorism design guidelines are mainly concentrated 
on reinforcing buildings with blast resistant materials, changing the shape of architecture and its 
orientation, some scholars are all for the idea to use aesthetics while thinking less vulnerable urban 
environment (Blieker, 2006) as far as, “Obtrusive security robs a city of its soul” (Briggs, 2005). 
It has been highlighted that the impact of anti-terrorism design on already planned environment 
relates as much to the psychological, as well as the physical aspects of the city and its inhabitants. 
Accordingly, instead of stating, that form follows function, in this case it is more relevant to say that 
form follows fear created by civilians formed into what we call security design. It has been stated 
that the main obstacle of achieving an adequate level of security in potential target buildings that 
will be both terror-resistant and at the same time aesthetically beautiful is a lack of people’s 
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interaction in design. It is suggested to have a cooperation between people who design spaces with 
its users (Briggs, 2005). 
According to the Briggs, an author of invisible security: The impact of counter-terrorism on the 
build environment, there are three main physical ways in which Anti-terrorism design impacts on a 
build environment:  
• “The militarization of urban space through the use of physical security barriers; 
• iconography; 
• a process of decentralization” (Briggs 2005). 
The militarization of urban space could be associated with ancient city planning and ‘fortress 
architecture’. A good example here could be a Belfast city in the Northern Ireland, where access to 
the center was initially reinforced by concrete blockers and later by high metal gates known as ‘ring 
of steel’. This term has been used again in 1990 to describe the security measurement for downtown 
London, that will be discussed as a good example of ‘fortification’ in following paragraphs. Belfast 
is an example of how fortifications and city walls affected civilian’s behaviors. It is relevant to say 
that, visible security makes people feel unsecured, even though there is no reason to be frighten. “A 
highly visible security not only sends the message ‘we take security seriously’ it also says that ‘we 
need to take security seriously” (Briggs, 2005) and direct ‘victims’ of this phrase is a psychology of 
city dwellers.  
A vivid examples of how anti-terrorism design affects human behavior, can be found in the US, 
London embassy that is being described as ‘the fortress in the square’, evidences have shown that 
existing anti-terrorism and “security defenses of the building has offended ‘aesthetical sensibility’ of 
local residents, some of whom have moved away rather than living near a perceived terrorist target” 
(Coaffee et al, 2006). To support a negative idea, caused by turning buildings into fortresses, Jason 
Burke argues that “ planning has been co-opted in the name of security through the construction of 
multilayer counter-terror defense that has had significant physical, social and economic impacts, it is 
argued that security measures in most cases detract from the aesthetic value of the street and reduce 
public accessibility around the site, while increasing the perceived vulnerability of neighborhood 
residences and business”(Burke 2008).  
It is a vivid fact that, barriers, fortification, concrete walls cause the fear rather than the hope and 
confidence of American society (Coaffee et al, 2006). Unfortunately, most planners have wrong 
24 
 
impression about anti-terrorism architecture, this is the reason why “national capitals have become 
fortresses, city peppered with bollards, bunkers and barriers owing both to a lack of funding for 
anything nicer and a lack of strategic coordination between policymakers” (Benton-Short, 2007).  
The end of Urban iconography, as a result of 9/11 events, the power and attractiveness of symbolic 
buildings have been highlighted and made it less popular among planners and clients to create 
another attractive target for terrorists, leading to “more sober-looking cities…less high-rise, less 
representative, less ‘signature’ fashion” development” (Marcus 2002).   
However, some researchers think oppositely, like Coaffee. He thinks that there is just a little chance 
that our urban landscape will become less interesting after numerous attacks on world famous iconic 
buildings. For illustrating his claim, he outlines a re-development project of World Trade Center in 
NY. The complex is going to comprise buildings even taller than the twin towers (Coaffee 2003). In 
addition to that, a number of examples throughout the world reinforcing his statements. For instance, 
Rem Koolhaas 80-storey building in Beijing, and other world tallest buildings, that have been 
constructed or are still under construction (Waudhuysen and Abley, 2004). 
City planners understand the importance of developing creative and iconic architecture. 
Consequently, with urban renewal and development processes, society has to face up to its fears. 
However, James Waudhuysen, a modern commentator states that it is possible for architects and 
planners to make something creative without creating ambitious buildings so as less vulnerable 
targets for probable terrorist attacks (Waudhuysen and Abley, 2004). 
City sprawl and decentralization after bombing cities like Dresden and Tokyo, as well as nuclear 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, demonstrated a destructive power that existed in the 
world, idea of city sprawl has become as strategy for number of planners. A pioneer of using 
decentralization of cities as a solution to avoid significant number of causalities is Tracey and Augur 
an American urban planners. Augur in his book The Dispersal of Cities as a Defense Measure 
argues that “dispersed pattern of small efficient cities, (that are) much more attuned to the needs of 
modern living, modern commerce and modern industry” should be developed in place of adding to 
the dense cities which he argued would make them “more inviting targets” (Augur, 1948). The idea 
behind Augurs statement is that, if major functional cores in cities are dispersed properly the use of 
a nuclear weapon won’t have a disastrous impact on city life. In addition, it is inclined to believe 
that with the proper dispersal of industry and population, no single attack will be able to disturb 
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production in a specific area, making it less likely to be targeted. Moreover, it will be vividly more 
resilient (Bartolo, 2012).  
Augur’s new idea is establishing satellite town that is similar to Ebenezer Howard’s Garden city 
concept. According to another planner, Donald Monson, he states that the idea of satellite towns is 
not enough and that the center of cities needed to be broken up to create a safer environment 
(Monson 1953). There ideas and plans also comprises implementing highway projects for a better 
connection between satellite towns. American urban pattern is a clear example of Augur’s and 
Monson’s ideas: increase number of highway is used as a defense tool for Americans. Car 
dependent American society can leave peacefully in a suburban area away from potential targets of 
terror attacks.  
 
 
1.1.4. Security planning Trends for terror-resistant cities 
 
Understanding security planning varies between countries and centuries. However, in a 
contemporary world, ‘invisible’ security is becoming more inevitable and more acceptable for 
civilians (Coaffee et al, 2009). It is relevant to mention that “successful places are safe, well 
maintained and well managed. Achieving this depends on managing the physical asset effectively 
and appropriately. With the right structures, people who live and use the place will be able to 
influence what happens there” (English partnership 2007). Surprisingly, some USA planning 
guidelines, issued in search of creating urban security by implementing and even promoting ideas 
such are: open spaces, accessibility, and iconographies in cities. A good example here could be 
FEMA’s ideas on better perimeter security design: 
• “providing an appropriate balance between the need to accommodate perimeter security for 
sensitive buildings and … the vitality of the public realm; 
• providing security in the context of streetscape enhancement and public realm beautification, 
rather than as a separate or redundant system of components whose only purpose is security; 
• expanding the palette of elements that can gracefully provide perimeter security in a manner 
that does not clutter the public realm, while avoiding the monotony of endless lines of jersey 
barriers or bollards, which only evoke defensiveness; 
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• producing a coherent strategy for deploying specific families of streetscape and security 
elements in which priority is given to achieving aesthetic continuity along streets; 
• providing perimeter security in a manner that does not impede the City’s commerce and 
vitality, excessively restrict or impede operational use of sidewalks or pedestrian and 
vehicular mobility, nor impact the health of existing trees” (FEMA 430, 2007). 
However, current security planning has a much larger focus, rather than just thinking about 
aesthetical appearance of security installations. This part of the paper will review security trends 
through maintaining aesthetical and characteristic outlook of the site. According to FEMA 
guidelines “Security solutions need to be very carefully planned to maintain the public amenities 
and aesthetic qualities in neighborhoods in which residents and visitors feel welcomed, comfortable, 
and safe” (Davis, 1992; FEMA 426, 2003). 
 
 
1.1.4.1.Major site-specific security design principles 
 
According to the fact that terrorism is a new phenomenon for most of countries in the world, it is not 
surprising, that not every country has its own security polices suitable for their urban character, 
while some countries do not make it public. Consequently, thesis will analyse site security 
guidelines on American and United Kingdom examples.  
Starting with the ‘four Ds’ of antiterrorism design that has been designated by FEMA 426 reference 
manual: 
“Deter: The process of making the target inaccessible or difficult to defeat with the weapon or tactic 
selected. It is usually accomplished at the site perimeter using highly visible electronic security 
systems, fencing, barriers, lighting, and security personnel; and in the building by securing; 
Detect: The process of using intelligence sharing and security services response to monitor and 
identify the threat before it penetrates the site perimeter or building access points. 
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Deny: The process of minimizing or delaying the degree of site or building infrastructure 
damage or loss of life or protecting assets by designing or using infrastructure and equipment 
designed to withstand blast and chemimcal, biological, or raidiolagical effects. 
 
Devalue: The process of making the site or building of little to no value or consequence, from 
the terrorists’ perspective, such that an attack on the facility would not yield their desired 
result” (FEMA 430, 2003). 
 
Deterrence can be achieved by physical barriers, special signs, lights, specially reinforced street 
furniture, and etc. “Security experts agree that deterrence is an essential component in physical 
security planning” (Peart, 2010), this tactic increases security by minimalizing the chance that 
criminal will select a particular site for violent activities. Owing to the fact that deterrence often 
leads to fortress image of the site, it requires a proper design implementations. While designing 
physical barriers against any possible threat, it is important to hide them from potential offenders 
sight in order to make it harder for terrorists to plan their attack in advance.  
Implementing strategy of detection, allows security forces to identify a potential threat and react 
adequately before it penetrates into a vulnerable site. Detection is relatively depending on site 
design. Good site organization will make detection possible without any blocking lines or sights. 
Detection of site can be achieved by alarms, sensors, CCTV cameras and by police presence on the 
site. In order to organize area, it is crucially important to strongly define activities, takes place in it, 
as well as connection between various urban spots. The following activities could be included: 
organized parking’s, eating places, shopping, and etc. As for connectors, they can be paths and 
routes for both vehicular and pedestrian movements. This Anti-terrorism strategy could be related to 
CPTED strategy of natural surveillance, that will be discussed in following chapter. For natural 
surveillance, it is important that vulnerable target is seen from every corner.  
In order to achieve detection, it is crucially important to minimalize hidden spaces, also it is 
important to choose the type and placement of lighting, plantings and etc., not to block the 
surveillance by the guard or by the CCTV cameras on vulnerable objects. It should be mentioned 
that continuous surveillance is more successful, when the site layout has a minimum number of 
entry points. 
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Strategy of deny is more relevant on a building scale, as far as it comprising reinforcing building 
construction frame, as well as exterior to turn it into more blast resistance. The methods and ways of 
denying possible terrorist targets will not be developed in a following chapter as far as thesis is 
concentrated only on urban design rather than architecture and structure of buildings.  
As for devalue it is an important strategy for redistributing threat value in a surrounding territory 
leading to less valuable, and less vulnerable sites. This principle will be implemented in 
experimental project, described in Chapter 3.  
 
 
 
 
1.1.4.2.Anti-terrorism design guidelines for increasing security on the site 
 
This sub-subparagraph will describe various anti-terrorism design strategies provided by FEMA risk 
management series. It is an undeniable fact that the most effective and sophisticated method of 
dealing with the blast explosive is extended distance between vulnerable object and its perimeter 
barriers. In another word, it is crucially important to increasing a standoff distance. Standoff 
distance is “the distance between a barrier and a protected building” (The National Capital Planning 
Commission, 2005). The main obstacle for planners, is the fact that already constructed buildings 
are impossible to be moved once situated. In this case increasing the distance between streets and 
vulnerable buildings can only be achieved by extending building yards or even sidewalks. Another 
solution suggested by FEMA guidelines could be closing off some streets for vehicles.   
The importance of standoff distance has been shown by various studies on objects that strongly or 
partly affected by blast explosion. However, there is not a precisely approved standard of standoff 
distance, as far as it can be determined by various factors such are threat rate, size of expected 
explosive and even the acceptable level of damage can be taken into account.  
In order to plan an adequate standoff distance for a specific target object, there are two main features 
that should be taken into considered: “Mandatory evacuation distance (distance, at which 
unreinforced building is able to withstand severe damage or collapse) … and preferred evacuation 
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distance (distance, where people are in danger of being injured or killed by items through by the 
explosive blasts)” (FEMA 452, 2013).  
The idea of a mandatory evacuation as well as preferred evacuation distances by considering all 
important features, can be following (table 1): 
Threat description Mandatory evacuation 
distance 
Preferred evacuation distance  
Suicide vest  21 meters 366 meters 
Suitcase bomb 34 meters 518 meters 
Car bomb 98 meters 564 meters 
Van  122 meters 732 meters 
Track 195 meters 1159 meters 
Table 1 Mandatory and preferred evacuation distances by means of different ways of explosion (Source: 
FEMA 426) 
 
In case of high density in cities and not existence of sufficient standoff distances, protection 
measures can be accomplished by reinforcing not only target object, but also surrounding territory 
by taking adequate distance from potential target object. However, this radius can be varying. 
A good illustration of necessity of standoff distance, can be a terror attack case in 1996 that affected 
Khobar tower complex building in Saudi Arabia and its surrounding site (figure 1).  
                                                                                                                                                
                Setback distance:25 meters                        52 meters                                                122 meters                         
 
                   Very high damage, possible collapse 
                   Unrepairable structural damage 
                   Moderate, repairable damage 
 
Figure 1 Illustration contrast of Khobar tower and its surrounding site in case of three different distances 
between the site and vulnerable building. Source: FEMS 426 
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Khobar tower case is a good illustration to what extent the blast can damage surrounding buildings. 
It also highlights the importance of standoff distance. Apart from standoff distance, building shape 
has a crucially important role in diminishing casualties caused by blast explosion. For instance, “U” 
or “L” shaped buildings, also strategies for building placement on the site, can rise or decrease its 
vulnerability (FEMA 426, 2003). As has been mentioned above, ideal location of an object is far 
away from the perimeter boundaries and property lines (FEMA 430, 2007). In addition to that, 
making plaza in front of main façade of the building and just leaving few setback distances on other 
sides of the building, can be beneficial, however it can lead to increase vulnerability rate of the rest 
3 sides of the building. It has been outlined that site, surrounded with open space, is beneficial for its 
monitoring as well as for standoff distance value. 
According to FEMA guidelines, site should have more than one access for evacuation, strongly 
controlled and defined exits and entry points, as well as strongly separated vehicle and pedestrian 
flows. (FEMA 430, 2007). 
Turning into three layers of defense, anti-terrorism design strategy that arranges built and natural 
environment around vulnerable assets (figure 2). 
• First layer of defense, is 
an outer layer of the site also 
called as exterior community. In 
order to understand first layer of 
defense, it is important to have 
an in-depth knowledge of each 
type of activities and functions 
of buildings existing in the first 
layer. It can be analysed with 
help of GIS software as well as 
FEMA HAZUS tool (FEMA 
430, 2007).  
Figure 2 Site 3 layers of defense. 
Source: FEMA 430 
• Second layer of defense, is a space between the defended area and the potential vulnerable 
target. The main objectives of the second layer of defense is to prevent terrorists from 
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interior areas. Second layer of defense can also be called as a standoff distance (FEMA 426, 
2003) Wide standoff areas between a target and its perimeter defenses enables planners to 
perform target hardening improvements rapidly (FEMA 430, 2007)  
• Third layer of defense refers to the protection of the asset itself. The main aim of Third layer 
of defense is to reinforce building’s envelope and its structure. It is really hard to create third 
layer of defense on already planned building. Less standoff distance requires more mass and 
more steel construction for hardening the building, also thicker and stronger glass.  
It is an undeniable fact that sometimes it is not possible to achieve relevant standoff distance, 
especially in downtowns where most buildings are occupying blocks completely, followed with high 
density and crowded places. In this case FEMA guidelines suggest to organize high valuable 
buildings together instead of dispersing important facilities, like this it is possible to achieve 
sufficient standoff distance (FEMA 430, 2007).  
In search of hardening the site and turning so called ‘soft’ targets into ‘hard’ targets, following 
elements can be used for implementing into second and third layers of defense (FEMA 430, 
2007) (picture 3; picture 4). 
Permeable defense elements could be: bollards, trees, street furniture, large objects, and etc. As 
for impermeable elements they could be walls, terraces, raised planting beds, fences etc.  
Bollards/planters (1) in most cases used as vehicle barriers. It prevents vehicles from passing but 
allows entrances for pedestrians and cyclists. It is usually made of steel. It is suggested to design 
bollards specifically for a particular project in order to be harmonized with existing materials, 
characteristics and forms of surrounding buildings. Those security elements can also have other 
functions, rather than just preventing vehicles from direct penetrations. For instance, they can be 
used as benches for sitting and etc. (FEMA 430, 2007).  
Heavy objects and trees (2) can also be used in anti-terrorism design, sometimes instead of bollards 
or as an independent security design elements. “Heavy objects could be large sculptural objects, 
massive boulders, dense planting and trees” (FEMA 430, 2008). Those elements can be used in a 
similar way as bollards for preventing direct vehicular access to the asset. “Specially designed 
objects that serve practical and aesthetic purposes can be used as an effective barrier.” (FEMA 430, 
2008) For instance, IAMSTERDAM monument located next to the Rijksmuseum, is one of the most 
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touristic place, however, it is a heavy object intended to protect public spaces against high speed 
approaches by vehicles.  
Water obstacles (3) is one of the oldest security design element, that is being widely used in the 
form of artificial or natural lakes, ponds, rivers, and fountains. Water can be an effective and 
beautiful choice for a barrier.  
Jersey barriers (4) is not a good example of security design elements. They are not easily adaptable, 
as far as they come in standard length. In addition to that, they do not have aesthetically pleasant 
appearance.  
Fences (5) are a traditional choice for security barriers. Compared to bollards they block entrances 
for both pedestrian and vehicle flows.   
Reinforced street furniture and fixtures (6). According to FEMA, it is possible to reinforce street 
furniture and turn them into barriers. Those elements can be: hardened street furniture, planters, light 
standards, bus shelters, kiosks, and etc.  
The NOGO barrier (7) is a barrier system, designed specifically for Wall Street area in New York 
City. It is partly a security device and partly a public art object. NOGO is combined with Turntable, 
it can also work as an active anti-ram system. (FEMA 430, 2007) 
The Tiger Trap (8) combining sidewalks and planting systems. Its main aim is to diminish impact of 
force and at the same time maintain distinctive character of the area. Tiger Trap’s major working 
principle is following: they can resist pedestrian load, however, vehicle load can collapse it. 
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Figure 3 Elements of Anti-terrorism design. Source: FEMA 430 
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Figure 4 Elements of Anti-terrorism design. Source: FEMA 430, ASLA 2005 Professional Awards 
 
There are numerous of other ways of reducing vehicular approach speed to major buildings, 
sometimes it can be achieved without physical barriers by “designing entry roads to the site and 
buildings so that they do not provide direct or straight-line access” (FEMA 430, 2007). In addition 
to that, indirect approaches to a building in combination with landscape architecture, can solve this 
problem. It is strongly suggested by FEMA 430, that gatehouses can be beneficial in case it is 
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impossible to have a dramatical changes on already planned infrastructure (FEMA 430, 2007). 
While talking about vehicles and potential threat from them, it is relevant to mention the importance 
of parking reorganization. According to FEMA guidelines, not adequately organized parking can 
turn the target into more vulnerable object against any possible threat. There are number of existing 
functional zones and elements that need a relevant consideration into design. Appropriate design and 
redistribution of parking, plazas and yards can lead to a successful anti-terrorism design and at the 
same time welcoming open spaces for a public realm. 
The following already approved considerations are crucially important while carrying out a 
reinforcement processes on a potential vulnerable target. A good parking design should include the 
following: 
• provide appropriate setback between parking and building, that needs protection; 
• parking lots should have a clearly marked location separated from pedestrian flow; 
• have a tactic location of public parking near the site or outside the stand-off zone; 
• have a one-way circulation to facilitate in order to have an easy surveillance on vehicles; 
• be surrounded with carefully chosen plantings in order not to distract natural surveillance on 
parking lots;  
• it is important to clearly separate vehicular access points to the buildings from pedestrian 
flows; 
• be equipped with CCTV cameras for better monitoring and continues surveillance. (FEMA 
430, 2007). 
As for underground parking, it need extra security measures, especially if it is located under the 
vulnerable building.  
Three layers of defense are similar in arrangement of plazas. Additional space that is provided by 
plazas, enables effective second layer of defense to be achieved in an urban level. It allows 
designers to install interesting forms, intending maintaining the idea of plaza and at the same time 
improving security level.  
A good example here could be a plaza of Minneapolis courthouse in United States, (figure 5) that is 
located on top of the garage roof. Design of plaza reflects its cultural and natural landscape while 
earth mounds make direct vehicular penetration almost impossible into the site.  
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Picture 5. Minneapolis Courtyard plaza (Source: FEMA 430) 
 
 
 
1.1.4.3.Aesthetics of Anti-terrorism design and ‘invisible’ security 
 
Owing to the fact that equipping building with relevant security elements, in some cases may cause 
a dramatic change in overall outlook of the building, many scholars and researchers are trying to 
solve the problem of aesthetics in anti-terrorism design by outlining the importance of ‘invisible’ 
security. Consequently, while barricades and barriers used to define anti-terrorist urban landscape in 
1990s in Great Britain, in recent years there have been a significant attempt to humanize security in 
cities, so “architects and urban planners begin to think more creatively about how they can hide 
security behind design features” (Briggs, 2005).  
Coaffee, sees the necessity of aesthetical architecture while balancing security features. He calls this 
process ‘urban renaissance’ and claims that it is the main determinant of transformation our cities 
during the last 5-10 years (Coaffee 2003). Meanwhile, a good security design in downtowns provide 
decent number of places for social interaction. Accepting public realm in a vulnerable place is a 
foundation of ‘Invisible’ security.  
“What landscape architects think about first when challenged with a perimeter security project is, 
well, the public realm, this is going to be something that is going to appear in the public realm, and 
at least we Americans typically think of the public realm as the floor of democracy. It’s the place 
where we’re free, and that means free will, but also freedom to move” (Cortnay 2011).  Roger 
Cortnay’s opinion, has been implemented into one of the most famous jersey barriers, in 
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Washington monument, that has been a main topic of discussion. About five years ago it has been 
replaced by a decorative wall at the base of the hill, designed by landscape architect Laurie Olin. 
Tourists commonly treat it like a bench, but in reality, it designed for the purpose of stopping a truck 
(Badger, 2011). Another example could be new Emirates Stadium in North London with its anti-
terrorism design element. It has been later recognized as a good example of new building site 
security design feature. Like ‘IAmsterdam’ ‘ARSENAL’ is spelled with concrete letters, preventing 
vehicle access, and meanwhile encourages public realm on the site (BBC, 2007; Coaffee and 
Bosher, 2008). 
Other anti-terrorism features are possible to be even more invisible. For instance: turntables, tiger 
traps, flower pots as a bollard, CCTV cameras, and etc. “Technological development and design 
imperatives create security that is almost invisible to the or ‘light touch” (Coeffee and O’Hare, 
2008), that will therefore bring aesthetics and access benefits to the site. However, it will rise some 
serious questions: 
• “Who makes decisions and how are they monitored? 
• Where does the power and authority to take such decisions lie? 
• How will technologies be used in public and private spaces? 
• What is the balance between civil design and security with regard to the ‘war on terror’?” 
(Briggs, 2005).  
Ruth Reed, president of the Royal Institute of British Architects, highlighted the importance of 
public realm while introducing 2010 counter-terrorism design guidelines: “It is important that our 
built environment continues to reflect that we are an open and inclusive society, and that in 
interpreting these new requirements our buildings do not convey that we are driven by security 
measures” (Reed, 2010).  
According to Stephen Ward “While the protection of people must remain primary aim’ of any kinds 
of design, it is vital that all alterations to our historic places are carefully considered and sensitively 
handled, if character, charm, and historic interest are not to be the first and, perhaps, the only 
victims of the threat” (Ward, 2004). It is relevant to mention that UK has number of legislations and 
policies protecting characteristic features of historical buildings while reinforcing them against any 
terror activities. Anti-terrorism design has two key impacts on protected zones: visual and physical. 
Due to the fact, that it is rather difficult to reinforce historical buildings against blast explosion, it is 
quite flexible to deal with this issue by putting the secure boundaries as far away from the building 
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envelope as possible. Moreover, it is suggested to implement security measures to historic building 
exterior and inner structures. Nicely and adequately designed physical barriers, can prevent 
uncontrolled vehicular access to surrounding streets.  
Another aesthetical issue could be, maintaining idea of public spaces and at the same time protecting 
them from possible threats. If we define public space as a ‘social space’ that is generally open and 
accessible to people of all levels, considering accessibility problem is crucially important in each 
level of anti-terrorism design. While talking about accessibility, we should distinguish accessibility 
by vehicles and by pedestrians. Contemporary urban defense design tries to organize traffic flow 
instead of abolishing movements of pedestrians on the streets.  
According to number of scholars, security and insecurity can also be associated to the structure and 
organization of the road. Although Hillary and Sahbaz have argued that there are insufficient studies 
to form any conclusions regarding the impact of road network reorganization on crime rate (Hillary, 
and Sahbaz 2009), later on with other researchers (Hillier and Shu (1998)Shu (2000)Hillier (2004) 
agree that “being located on a development with high levels of permeability connectivity (and) 
through-movement reduces the risk of crime.” In contrast, number of scholars are having an 
opposite idea that this circumstance increases crime rather than decreases it (Bevis and Nutter 
(1977) Rubenstein et al (1980) Taylor and Gottfredson (1987) Van der Voordt and Van Wegen 
(1990) White (1990) Poyner and Webb (1991) Beavon et al (1994) Mirlees-Black et al (1998) 
Rengert and Hakim (1998) Hakim et al (2001) Taylor (2002) Nubani and Wineman (2005) Yang 
(2006) Armitage (2006)) 
According to unclear results, this consequence will be tested in Chapter 2 of this thesis, with another 
hypothesis that Being located on a cul-de-sac, or a development with low connectivity, reduces the 
risk of crime (Bevis and Nutter (1977) Johnson and Bowers (2010)), although urban planners think 
that cul-de-sac roads is not acceptable as far as it determines long journeys and turn some places 
harder to be accesses. Meanwhile some researcher state that “using street as an ‘invisible’ security 
tool for reducing crime can be achieved by closing this street itself” (Matthews (1992) Atlas and 
LeBlanc (1994) Newman (1995,1996) Lasley (1998) Zavoski et al (1999) Eck (2002)) 
Related to this topic, Dr. Rachel Armitage carried out interesting research. Her research main 
concentration was on street layout. She considered, that a specific street patterns, could be a 
determinant factor of site’s vulnerability. After looking through crime statistics, Armitage, research 
pointed out that “Sinuous culs-de sac roads are safer than those with a linear layout.” (Armitage, 
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2011) This finding has become significantly important for future researches as well as for this thesis 
work. 
One of the most relevant design example that could have a firm relation with the idea of having a 
minor security implementation in major cities downtowns without affecting an overall image of the 
city, could be a sophisticated idea of defending London a capital of England against terror attacks. 
The idea is more likely associated with organizing road network in an appropriate manner. 
This approach can also be 
associated with ‘fortress 
urbanism’. The ring of steal , 
instead of concrete barricades and 
road barriers uses contemporary 
defense systems such are: CCTV 
cameras and various  
environmental elements: 
 
 
Picture 6 London Ring of the steel, experimental traffic scheme. Source: Harvard design magazine 
boxes, bollards, one way systems street furniture and plantings for extra layer of defense. A 
significant fact about this principle is that, some unsafe activities are removed from streets and has 
maximized control on access points (picture 6). In doing so, in some streets 2 direction movements 
have been abolished. The way of organizing roads by “London Ring of the steel” gives a natural 
surveillance on the site. Only seven entrances have remained on the site and armed guards were 
disposed in each road checks. It is not a surprising fact that, another name of a ‘London ring of the 
steel’ is ‘experimental traffic scheme.’  
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As for a good ‘invisible’ security example for small scaled site reinforcement, that will also be 
implemented in farther process of thesis development, could be Mies van der Rohe, Chicago federal 
center, built during the years of 1959-1974. The plaza next to the building is designed to serve as 
public communal space. Complex includes: farmers market, public gatherings and a large sculpture 
that can be understand as an identity of the place. In the past, the problem of the site was the lack of 
decent standoff distance, another problem that had been faced up with the project was to design 
building with open ground floor to provide easy access to visitors and to connect one street to 
another. (FEMA 430, 2007) As a result of security design implementation, first layer of defense is 
provided with bollards, granite blocks and benches that has been selected to harmonize with 
building architecture and materials. In order to avoid direct vehicular penetration from the street 
intersection, pedestrian lines have been reinforced with bollards system. As for second layer of 
defense, it has been achieved by plantings and various barrier systems that on itself gives the sense 
of public openness.  
Figure 7  Chicago 
center. Source FEMA 
430 
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1.2. Place based crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) principles and 
practices: 
 
1.2.1. First and second-generation Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
definition and history; 
 
Target hardening and anti-crime design was made popular through the movement known as crime 
prevention through environmental design. Compared to anti-terrorism design strategies, it is quite 
common that crime prevention through environmental design is widely implemented into very basic 
levels of planning. Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) is one of the most 
popular urban planning strategies in search of decreasing crime rates on the site. This strategy uses 
specific design features as a tool. Main aim of CPTED is to elude potential criminal activities that 
can make a change on the built environment (Lee et al, 2016).  Idea of CPTED has a strong 
background of environmental psychology and its belief that human behavior can be determined and 
influenced by surrounding built environment (Cozens et al, 2005). 
The term ‘crime prevention through environmental design’ first have been used by Ray Jeffery in 
1977. As for Jane Jacobs book ‘The Death and life of Great American Cities’ is considered to be the 
origin of forming the idea of CPTED principles (Lee et al, 2016). 
There are four key features that are strongly connection with any crime events, those are following:  
• “a law;  
• offender;  
• target;  
• place” (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). 
It is an undeniable fact that there are much possibilities to analyse places rather than offender’s 
behavior or law and victims. From the beginning of 19th century, it has been stated that some places 
are more vulnerable for criminal activities compared to others, and this difference was mainly 
caused by differences in urban features, provided by different sites (Cozens et al, 2005) According 
to a highlighted importance of place in crime prevention principles, a widely accepted description of 
CPTED could be: “the proper design and effective use of the built environment (that) can lead to a 
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reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life” (Crowe, 
2000). 
A lot of researchers and scholars started to investigate relationship between human behavior and its 
environment, as far as “It is fairly obvious that the form of urban environment affects the 
distribution and circulation patterns of its inhabitants. People generally walk along sidewalks or 
streets but seldom traverse blocks. People follow designated paths in parks and gardens; they 
tend to wait for the bus at the bus station and not along its route; and, they enter their 
homes through the front or back door. Changes in the design of the physical environment 
will, therefore, affect their circulation behavior and the frequency of meeting and seeing 
other people”(Angel, 1968). Consequently, it is quite possible to control human’s behavior in space 
and in some cases even use them as a tool for preventing crime. For instance, Angel in his paper 
defines the idea of controlling pedestrian density and flows. He states that with help of moving 
density from areas with high values of criminal activities, will diminish number of casualties. 
According to Angel’s theory it can be achieved by concentrating same functional businesses in one 
spot and providing safe parking for every spot.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, architect Oscar Newman carried out a study about large public 
housing estates in St Louis and New York. His publication, Defensible Space: 
Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, reinforced the idea about a strong connection between 
crime and environment. Newman developed the concept of ‘defensible space’, which he viewed as a 
“range of mechanisms—real and symbolic barriers... (and) improved opportunities for surveillance-
that combine to bring the environment under the control of its residents” (Newman, 1972). Another 
key point that has been highlighted by Newman in his book is that, ‘defensible space’ can be the 
one, were people are able to be a spectator of all events that takes place around them. Also, it is 
crucially important that people should be seen continually.  In addition to that, it is also important, 
people to have a common will to report all criminal behaviors when it occurs. Newman claimed that 
it was an encouragement for people to control areas where they spend most of their time, and like so 
ensure the role of ownership. When civilians feel safe in their neighborhoods, they are getting more 
willing to be active and free to report any criminal activities that takes place in thein neighborhoods. 
Oscar Newman in 1972 highlighted key elements of CPTED: 
• surveillance (ability to monitor activities on the site); 
• territoriality (separation of public and private activities); 
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• image maintenance (the image of a place is an important factor in reducing opportunities for 
criminals); 
• milieu (environmental land use. Selection of a secured site for a new development is 
important). (Newman, 1972) 
According to Poyner, the attractiveness of Newman’s idea was that “… His main aim was to find 
ways of changing the underlying structure of the environment so that it would not attract criminal 
behavior” (Poyner, 1983).   
Another discipline that has a significant influence on CPTED development is environmental 
criminology. Even though Rey Jeffery was an inspiration of CPTED, he dedicates major part of his 
work to environmental criminology, rather than CPTED. According to Geographers Herbert and 
Hyde, environmental criminology tends to investigate vulnerable areas, where the possibility of 
occurring any criminal activities are high compared to less vulnerable areas (Herbert and Hyde 
1985). Main difference between crime prevention through environmental design and environmental 
criminology is that, environmental criminology is more concentrated on human psychology and 
behaviors. As for CPTED, it is more concentrated on understand environmental features that could 
be a determinant factor of criminal behaviors (Crowe 1991).  
Environmental criminology is based on 3 theories:  
• Pattern Theory by Brantinghams;  
• Routine Activity theory by Marcus Felson;  
• Rational Choice theory by Ronald V. Clarke;  
Environmental criminology influenced a formation of situational crime prevention. This new 
discipline is based on a philosophy of environmental criminology. Notwithstanding, those two 
disciplines has developed in a different direction. The idea of situational crime prevention is 
cooperation between police and community members in order to protect their neighborhoods. 
(Rothrock, 2010). 
Before 1980s ‘defensible’ space design tools worked best in residential settings. However, after 80th, 
it has been observed that ‘defensible’ space theory was also efficient for institutional and 
commercial buildings. According to this, in search of improving ‘defensible ‘space strategies 
Newman and other researchers filled in CPTED features. Such are: 
• the ‘Broken Windows’ theory by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling;  
• ‘the four dimensions of crime’ theory by Patricia and Paul Brantingham; 
• ‘situational crime prevention’ theory by Ronald Clark and Patricia Mayhew;  
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• criminologist Timothy Crowe developed his CPTED training programs; 
In 1988 Timothy Crowe, published an article, uniting principles from ‘Defensible Space’, situational 
crime prevention and environmental criminology. He claims that CPTED is made up by 
combination of this fields. (T. Crowe 1988).  
This initial step of dealing with any kinds of criminal activities in an urban form with help of 
physical attributes and adequate urban planning and design principles is united under an umbrella of 
movement, known as 1st generation of CPTED. 
Turning into a second generation of CPTED that is inclined to believe an extension of 1st generation 
CPTED. It is a significant fact to be mentioned, that second generation is not replacing first 
generation principles. However, it adds first anti-crime design movement more social and cultural 
aspects in each neighborhood. 2nd generation CPTED, promotes considering design principles more 
on a neighborhood scale. 
Except this definition, 2nd generation of CPTED could be a strategy that main idea is to defend 
places from criminal activities by preventing crime from growing inside neighborhoods (Saville and 
Cleveland, 1999). A good explanation of new CPTED movement could be following: “Second 
Generation CPTED recognizes the most valuable aspects of safe community lie not in structures of 
the brick and mortar type, but rather in structures of family, of thought and, most importantly of 
behavior“ (Saville and Cleveland, 1999).  2nd generation of CPTED claims that it is possible to 
benefit from examining physical aspects and features of places and their relations to crime events, 
but is important to end up research on social aspects and neighborhoods. Consequently, it is not a 
surprising fact that, main task of 2nd generation CPTED is to: 
• form a residential association; 
• form a ‘neighborhood watch’; 
• enhance social cohesion;  
Those tasks are later implemented into creating principles and strategies for 2nd generation CPTED, 
described in a following subparagraph.  
According to Saville and Cleveland research, the theory of 2nd generation CPTED could be 
comprising following: 
1) ‘human scale development’, as far as size of the district and its density can consider the 
extent of social interactions.  It is difficult to control your neighborhood and know all 
dwellers when there are almost 3000 households and when the schools have same number of 
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students. However, Cleveland and Saville agree on the fact that accomplishment of this 
theory mainly depends of culture and personal respect. 
2) the density and variety of urban meeting places is very important as far as the lack of it will 
lead to empty spaces. Consequent, social interaction will become impossible. There is a high 
risk of undesirable activities, that will take place in urban meeting places. However, 
someone should take a responsibility to organize ‘safe activities’ in their neighborhoods. 
Those events should happen until people will experience so called ‘neighborliness’. This 
theory is mainly associated with 1st generation CPTED strategy ‘activity support’. 
3) youth clubs are the places where local young generation can learn important things.  
4) resident’s participation is also associated with 1st generation CPTED idea of ‘activity 
support’ 
5) resident’s responsibility “have a direct influence on their expression of territoriality and 
defensible space” (Saville and Cleveland, 1999). 
 
It is inclined to believe that 2nd generation CPTED enables its strategy to be more realistic for crime 
prevention. It is much more reliable strategy in search of changing offender’s motives before 
committing a crime. 
 
According to what have been mentioned before, we can conclude that, first generation of CPTED, 
(‘First generation advanced’) mainly focused on physical environment while second generation of 
CPTED focuses on social aspects of design.   
 
 
 
 
1.2.2. First and second-generation crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) 
Principles and strategies 
 
There are five main principles of 1st generation of CPTED: natural surveillance, natural access 
control, territoriality, activity support, image maintenance. (Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design Guidebook). Some documents recognize six main principles of 1st generation 
of CPTED, adding ‘target hardening’ as a key strategy. According to Crowe’s, it is very important 
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that CPTED principles is understandable and practical for space users. Consequently, he offers 
remembering 3 ‘D’ strategy: designation, definition, and design. 3 ‘D’ strategy enables users to 
discover the purpose and design of a specific areas with a simple questioner (Crowe and Fennelly, 
2000) (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8 Space evaluation questioner according to Crowe’s 3 ‘D’ strategy. Source: Crime Prevention                                   
Through Environmental Design Guidebook 
CPTED principle of natural surveillance is influenced by Jane Jacobs and her ‘eye on the street’ 
theory. As for, Oscar Newman and his research on ‘defensible space’, farther developed this idea. 
Newman with his research discovered, that hidden places are more likely turning into venues of 
criminal activities, compared to the once that can be observed by people. Also, he stated that 
buildings and community design (civic design) are main encouragement for natural surveillance. For 
natural surveillance on the site it is important to have open and visible gathering spaces. 
Consequently, during late hours site should be equipped with design features that ensures lighting in 
every spot of the area.  Design should avoid hidden places. Inhabitants should have an 
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opportunity to monitor activities that takes place in their neighborhood from their windows. 
Also, police presence on the site is crucially important for natural surveillance strategy.     
The main idea behind the principle of ‘access control’ is “to keep a potential criminal out of the 
community and public spaces, through so-called ‘safe activities” (Lee et al, 2016). This principle 
can be achieved by creating visible or invisible barriers. Newman discovered, that multiple escape 
routes can turn the area into a vulnerable place and not resistant to any criminal activities (Newman, 
1972). For achieving natural access control on the site, it is important to consider following: using 
fences, lightings, various landscape elements, signage to clearly guide visitors to and from the site.  
Territoriality was also developed as a CPTED key strategies by Jacobs and Newman. The concept of 
territoriality introduces idea of social networks, in another word, community networks and claims 
that it is more efficient than just police forces (Jacobs 1961). Territoriality strategy gives superiority 
to residents to better control their communities. Strategy of territoriality also considers the idea of a 
strong separation between public and private activities. In doing so it is important to encourage 
communications between neighbors with relevant design features. In addition to that, appropriate 
design should provide visible or invisible boundaries between public, semi-public and private zones. 
Moreover, businesses should be identified with wall signs. 
Activity support can be achieved by implementing appropriate principles in an initial stage of 
design. Activity support encourages ‘safe activities’ on the site (Cozens et al, 2005). It is strongly 
believed, that detection of crime is much easier when site has a capacity to offer various activities to 
its users. Jacobs ‘eye on the street’ theory can be relevant for defining activity support strategy, she 
suggests, that streets and sidewalks with number of events and activities attracts people, that 
guarantees natural surveillance and easy detection of any potential crime events (Jacobs, 1961).   
Image Maintenance (Site management) principle is associated with Philip Zimbardo’s experiment, 
carried out in 1969 and a ‘broken window’ theory experimented by James Q. Wilson and George L. 
Kelling. Philip Zimbardo in his experiment used vehicles without license. He parked cars in Bronx 
and left intendedly. Inattentively left vehicle soon had turned into victims of vandalism. The 
inspiration of Zimbardo’s experiment is Kelling’s and Wilson’s ‘Broken window’ theory. This 
theory states that, “once there is one window broken and left unattended, there will be more broken 
windows in the row” (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). To say in another word “the actual presence of 
disorder-related cues, negatively influenced the perception of crime-related problems” (Perkins et al, 
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1992) For accomplishing maintenance strategy, it is important to some restrictions on some 
activities in common areas that can damage the image of neighborhood.  
Uniting these five concepts, are considered as backbone of traditional CPTED strategies. In search 
of complete fulfillment of CPTED main principles, Crowe, a director of the National Crime 
Prevention Institute suggests nine strategies: 
1. “provide clear border definition of controlled space. 
2. provide clearly marked transitional zones, that indicates movement from public to 
semipublic   to private space.  
3. relocate gathering areas to locations with natural surveillance and access control or locations 
away from the view of would-be offenders.  
4. place safe activities in unsafe locations. 
5. place unsafe activities in safe locations. 
6. re-designate the use of space to provide natural barriers to conflicting activities.  
7. improve scheduling of space. 
8. redesign or revamp space to increase the perception of natural surveillance. 
9. overcome distance and isolation through improved communications and design efficiencies” 
(Crowe, 1991). 
As for second generation of CPTED, Saville and Cleveland's identified elements of a Dutch 2nd 
generation CPTED plan that they considered progressive. These elements are following: 
• “the necessity of human-scale development 
• the importance of urban meeting places 
• establishment of youth clubs 
• engaging residents to procure participatory support and encourage responsibility regarding 
maintenance and upkeep” (Saville and Cleveland, 1997). 
The key principles of 2nd generation of CPTED are following: “neighborhood capacity, community 
culture, social cohesion and connectivity” (Saville and Cleveland, 2003).  
Business/Neighborhood capacity in another word social cohesion, main aim is to give 
responsibilities to community residents, passersby, and neighborhood businesses to control all 
activities in their neighborhoods. This strategy can be achieved by social participation in organized 
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events, communication with other neighborhoods, creating groups in search of discussing 
neighborhood problems, their solutions, and etc.   
Community culture is the way of developing common sense of neighborhood and its history. In 
order to achieve this strategy, it is important to promote the idea of gender and other minority group 
equality strategies. For instance, organize events that will highlight distinctive character of 
neighborhood, common public transport, that therefore connects neighborhoods, and etc.  
Neighborhood threshold and capacity main aim is to serve some functions or support specific 
activities from neighborhood communities. This CPTED strategy highlights the importance of 
“economic and social stabilities that communities are dependent on” (Fisher and Lab, 2010) to not 
couse cause deterioration and abandonment of neighborhoods.    
Connectivity ensures a strong links between communities and strengthening community bonds in 
businesses, and activities referring to community and neighborhoods. It suggests the idea of 
common public transport, that will therefore connect neighborhoods. 
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1.3.  Placemaking Principles 
1.3.1.  Main urban design principles 
 
According to the fact that the thesis work aims to promote a possibility of cooperation between 
fields such are CPTED, anti-terrorism design urban and civic design strategies, it is relevant to start 
defining urban design principles for placemaking. 
“It is quite vivid, that downtowns in London in New York and other major cities are not just the 
products of anti-terrorism design or consideration of CPTED “ (Rothrock, 2010) It is an undeniable 
fact that, anti-terrorism guidelines initial consideration in design can protect buildings from a 
disastrous impact on economy and human’s health after terror attacks, as for CPTED it will regulate 
sense of safety among space users by implementing its strategies in a very initial stage of design. 
Although, this circumstance rises the necessity of optimizing both security design principles, in this 
case thesis work considers urban and environmental design as a tool for giving security design more 
aesthetical appearance. In other words, the aim of the work is to make a balance between security 
and appropriate usage of spaces. 
Many urban designers, architects and architecture theorists have tried to identify major physical 
attributes that will later leads to a good public space. Whyte, Lynch with his book “Theory of Good 
City Form” or “The image of the city” 
Mackay, Colman, Gosling, and etc.  
tried to identify all the elements in 
urban design practice that will later 
ensures a desirable place for public 
realm. There are strongly defined and 
internationally accepted some key 
elements that will irreversible create a 
usable urban space (figure 9). The key 
attributes are divided into other 
elements, those are the following: 
sociability, uses and activities, comfort.  
Figure 9 Diagram of placemaking principles, highlighting key attributes, intangible features, and 
measurements. Source: Project for Public Spaces; 
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According to Project for Public Spaces “a successfulness of a particular place depends on the 
potential of space to become an icon of public space.” (Project for Public Spaces, 2010) as well as 
accessibility to places.  
 
It is an undeniable fact that good urban design creates places which maintain sustainable, attractive, 
and desirable environments, that people are willing to use. British Home Office highlights seven 
urban design main attributes that creates desirable places.   
• “Character, place, with its own identity; 
• Continuity and enclosure, a place where access for the public is clearly identified.  
• Quality of the public realm, a place with a lot of attractive and successful areas accessible to 
the public.  
• Easy of movement, a place that is easy to get through but where routes do not compromise 
security.  
• Legibility, a place that has a clear image and is easy to understand. 
• Adaptability, a place that is capable to change easily. 
• Diversity, a place with a variety of activities for different aged groups and the choice for 
everyone.” (HM Government, 2012) 
There is number of other ideas about the major elements of urban design. Other scholars can 
highlight functionality, economy, convenience, aesthetics, and safety. However, a good place should 
be a combination of all what have been mentioned in this subparagraph.  
 
 
 
1.3.2. Civic design and its relevance to security design principles 
 
However, those above-mentioned design principles are more related to the work of planners rather 
than civilians itself. Nowadays, a trend of identifying space-users as a creator of environment, is 
quite actual. A lot of examples clarify the advantage of inhabitant’s participation in planning 
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processes. Due to the fact that, locals are the once who know the district and area better and they are 
the once who should use the space, they should know better what does that specific area requires. 
According to this, Civic design has much more power to create good public realm design and at the 
same time can be used as a strategy for humanizing anti-terrorism design principles. “Ideally, Civic 
design with Anti-terrorism design should not only protect people from upcoming attacks, but also 
engage them to understand a possible threat, design and encourage them to become a part of a 
citizenry in search of combat terror” (Rothrock, 2010). 
A good explanation of Civic Design could be: “Civic Design is approaching how we use, plan, 
physically design and support our communities and the public realm in a way that benefits citizens, 
citizenship and the city” (Steiner, 2006). 
Importance of Civic design has also been highlighted in second generation of crime prevention 
through environmental design. According to some scholars, the most important aspect of good and 
at the same time secured design, requires community mobilization as well as sense of neighborhood 
(Saville and Cleveland, 2003). Rothrock, in her research highlights five basic civic design 
principles: 
• “Multi-lateral implementation; 
• Accessibility; 
• Safety; 
• Stewardship; 
• Education;” (Rothrock, 2010).  
She strongly believes, that implementation of all this principle will create projects that “not only 
delight passerby’s, but that engage with people in the public realm” (Rothrock, 2010).  
Multi-lateral implementation (It comprises more than one group who are eager to implement their 
ideas in planning.) In the past, spaces have been created unilaterally, by a municipality or by a single 
person. However, it is believed that, civic design with a good result cannot be accomplished unless 
there are multiple organizations, or disciplines implemented in design processes.   
Multi-lateral implementation is also defined as a concept of using messiness in planning cities “To 
think of cities as messy places will properly caution us against the use of exclusive, unidimensional, 
or egocentric actions. To respect the messiness of cities encourages the opportunity for pluralistic 
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actions that not only will serve the very diverse interests of the city's people, but in the end, I 
maintain, will give greater delight and reward” (De Monchaux, 1989). 
This strategy varies with the way most anti-terrorism design interventions are implemented. It is 
quite clear that responsibilities on anti-terrorism design has taken by a special governmental 
organization, security organization and designers. However, it is very important to make the 
planning process transparent for community as well.  
Principle of accessibility in general has two major requirements. Firstly, anyone should be capable 
to find a place and should be allowed to go inside. It should not be a hidden place and should serves 
all potential users (old/young generations, disabled people etc.). Second, accessible place should be 
close to other major spots in a city.  
Safety is an important measure of good civic design. It is an undeniable fact that if the place is not 
safe it will turn into not desirable, inaccessible space for civilians.  
Stewardship is supervising and taking care of your community. According to the international 
dictionary ‘civic minded’ means “tending to do things that help your city or town and the people 
who live there” (Merriam-Webster, 2002). The main duty of civic design is to inspire people to take 
part in planning through maintaining the space or making it more interacted or even safer than 
before. A place that is being designed by people itself will automatically become important to 
people who live there and who contributed in creation of it.  
Same principle can be implemented in anti-terrorism design. Police control is not enough for rising 
security. People themselves, should have a civic sense is important for planning secured spaces. This 
can be achieved by educating communities in a right direction.   
Education It is a key to success. Educated community leads to a developed society, like so society 
becomes more than just the sum of people. In addition to that, a rise of public knowledge about the 
idea of their part in anti-terrorism design, will help citizens to be ready for any potential threats.  
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HYPOTHETICAL MODEL 
 
Hypothetical model is based on literature, analysed in Chapter 1 of this thesis work. For building up 
a relevant literature based model for terrorism resilient cities, a physical as well as social aspects 
have been taken into account.  
Looking through anti-terrorism design history and principles, vividly showing the importance of 
choosing and assessing right objects for implementing sophisticated security design strategies and 
reinforcing them against any possible terrorist attacks, while avoiding high number of causalities. 
Understanding terrorist motives and having ideas about their expectations after attacks can help 
designers and planners to diminish number of causalities (figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 Hypothetical model for urban planning and design for terrorism resilient cities. Illustration 
prepared by author 
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• Hypothetical model starts with vulnerable target selection. For instance, sites with national 
as well as international importance (religious objects, objects with political values, and etc.), 
also crowded places, with high concentration of civilians (transportation hubs, sport 
stadiums, pubs/clubs/bars, shopping centers/shopping streets, tourist attraction spots, cinema, 
theatre, commercial centers, business centers, parks, squares, ticket event venues or open 
access events like parades or street exhibitions and etc.); 
Hypothetical model considers anti-terrorism design main principles and its guidelines. For 
organizing main hypothesis, it uses ‘four Ds’ strategy: deter, detect, devalue, and deny (FEMA 426, 
2003); 
1. Deter: 
• for decreasing site vulnerability, hypothetical model suggests various anti-terrorism design 
elements specially for preventing vehicles penetrate into vulnerable areas. physical barriers, 
bollards, special signs, lights, reinforced street furniture, plantings, monuments, planters, 
heavy objects and trees, water obstacles/mounds, jersey barriers, fences, NOGO barriers, 
tiger traps, and etc. it is important, that all anti-terrorism design elements are hidden from 
offender’s sight.   
• hypothetical model suggests to increase a standoff distance (second layer of defense). In case 
of a high density, it offers surrounding building reinforcement against blast explosion 
(evacuation and mandatory distances); In addition to that, it suggests building to be 
surrounded by specially designed plaza. In case of not existence a sufficient standoff zone, 
hypothetical model considers the idea of keeping vulnerable same functional objects closer 
to each other, in order to make potential vulnerable targets easier to protect.  
• apart from this, it is important to minimalize vehicle access points to vulnerable buildings to 
elude potential attacks; 
• as far as vehicles are potential threat for vulnerable site, hypothetical model organizes 
parking away from attractive target objects for terrorists. Moreover, it considers following 
principles: provide appropriate setback between parking and building, that needs protection; 
clearly marked location for parking lots and separated from pedestrian flows; provides 
appropriate setback between parking and building, that needs protection; suggests one-way 
circulation to facilitate to have an easy surveillance on vehicles; 
2. Detect: 
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• suggests open space around site, as far as it makes it easier to monitor activities around the 
perimeter;  
• suggests minimalizing hidden places to achieve detection on the perimeter; 
• suggests natural surveillance, as far as it is crucially important that site is seen from every 
corner; 
• suggests using CCTV cameras and police force presence on the site; 
• suggests a tactic selection of planting, surrounding parking lots and other high-risk urban 
areas, so as not to disturb a natural surveillance. 
3. Deny: 
• in order to minimalize the chance of building collapse, hypothetical model suggests to 
reinforce building envelope as well as inner structures. 
4. Devalue: 
• well-used sites are an attractive target for terrorists. Consequently, hypothetical models 
suggest regulating activities on vulnerable sites.  
From Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles, hypothetical model uses 1st 
generation as well as 2nd generation CPTED key strategies: 
1. First generation of CPTED: 
• Natural surveillance suggests to have open gathering spaces; all areas should be equipped 
with lighting; design should avoid hidden places; site users should have an opportunity to 
monitor activities from their windows; police forces need to control the perimeter.  
• Access control suggests to create visible or invisible barriers for controlling perimeters; 
diminish number of escape routes; use landscape elements and signage to clearly guide 
visitors to and from the site; 
• Territoriality suggests strong separation between private and public and semi-public 
activities defined by fences, walls, and planting barriers. Businesses should be identified by 
wall signs.  
• Image maintenance suggests to restrict activities, that can damage neighborhood image and 
its functioning; 
• Activity support encourages site to be loaded with various safe activities, as far as it makes it 
easier to detect potential criminals. 
2. Second generation of CPTED: 
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• Social cohesion suggests social partnerships for organizing events, strong relationship links 
with other neighborhoods.  
• Community culture suggests organizing events for outlining neighborhood character.   
• Neighborhood capacity suggests to support activities from neighborhood communities; 
• Connectivity suggests to strengthen community by referring various activities to 
neighborhoods. For instance: common public transport, that therefore connects 
neighborhoods and etc.  
In order to humanize security design features, hypothetical model will consider urban planning as 
well as civic design principles. 
1. Urban planning: 
• suggests key elements that creates desirable places: sociability, usability, comfortability, 
accessibility; 
2. Civic design: 
• Multi-lateral implementation suggests to allow more social groups to take part in planning 
process; 
• accessibility suggests places to be accessible for everyone; 
• stewardship suggests social participation in controlling and taking care of their own 
neighborhoods; 
• education suggests developed community by educating neighborhood members. 
In order to avoid presence of unaesthetic security elements on the site, that steal the city its soul and 
creating fear among civilians, hypothetical model will use ‘invisible security’ as an additional 
design strategy.  
• hypothetical model suggests to hide security elements behind aesthetically expressive design 
features; 
• suggests to encourage public realm on vulnerable sites, by allowing civilians to use and 
discover all facilities provided by sites without fear of possible attacks, created by immense 
walls, fences barricades, a lot of prohibition signs and etc.  
• suggests to respect existing city layout, its historical and natural landscape; 
• suggests to make changes on street network reorganization, by considering London ‘ring of 
the steel’ as a good reference by strongly defining entry and exit points to and from the city. 
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In addition to that, hypothetical model suggests to avoids streets with liner layout and 
prioritizing sinuous cul-de sac roads as well as avoid vulnerable buildings on major roads.    
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In final analysis, we can deduce that anti-terrorism design has a long history and practice in an urban 
environment. Although, it has always been more militaristic, than welcoming, only concentrated on 
particular problems, such are investigating potential threats and implementing security design 
strategies without considering existing urban character. Even though, there are number of 
publications that can be used as guidelines for creating protective places, there is not one size fit 
solution for each site. 
• In the past, cities used to provide protection to its dwellers with help of immense walls and 
fortifications. However, life outside city gates, as well as commuting from one city to another had 
always been dangerous for civilians. Later on, a new necessity of organizing secured cities had 
highlighted. It is known as the principle of ‘satellite towns’, based on the concept of scattered 
infrastructural cores, in order to avoid high number of causalities, as well as city dysfunction 
problems that typically follows any kinds of attacks. As a good example of contemporizing past 
sophisticated ideas, in order to provide dwellers with high level of security inside the city, can be 
London ‘ring of the steel’. This ‘experimental traffic scheme’ strategy uses modern devices, 
mobilized police, bollards, planters, CCTV cameras, various anti-terrorism design features, strongly 
defined entry and exit points to and from London downtown, instead of immense fortification walls. 
Those ‘invisible’ security design elements, are a modernized idea of ‘fortifying’ city. Though, in a 
more humanized way. 
• Looking through terrorism cases and statistics on frequency of choosing a particular target object, 
while avoiding others, scholars have agreed that crowded places are more likely turning into targets 
for terror attacks. Most frequently, crowded places considered as a ‘soft targets’, rather than ‘hard 
targets’. In the past, frequently targeted sites were major cities, with high concentration of civilians. 
Nowadays, all major places in the city that has a high number of users, are considered as potential 
venues for upcoming attacks. It is an undeniable fact that, knowing in advance what to protect, will 
diminish the chance of successful attack, with desirable results for terrorists.  
• Turning into anti-terrorism design principles, it has been outlined that the main goal for counter-
terrorism is to ‘deter’, ‘detect’, ‘deny’ and to ‘devalue’ vulnerable buildings. Those four anti-
terrorism strategies can be accomplished by various scales of physical interventions. For instance: 
organizing standoff distances, equipping site with relevant environmental elements that can diminish 
a success rate of attacks. Considering civilians attitude towards environmental elements that has 
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been erected for the reason of protection, the importance of ‘invisible’ security has been highlighted. 
Consequently, it has been proved that irrelevant designs for security, can have opposite effects, such 
are: fearfulness, suspicious, paranoia and etc. among civilians. 
• According to what has been reviewed about Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
principles, we can deduce that CPTED, compared to anti-terrorism design is more concentrated on 
changes in social context and behavior, by means of improving community culture and 
understanding the necessity of safer environment for civilians. This concept is more vivid in 
contemporary CPTED (2nd generation of CPTED) that has turned into more community dominant 
design strategy. Social interaction is used as a design tool for security planning. As for 1st generation 
of CPTED, it suggests a humanized design solutions, that will not have a significant impact on 
already built environment. 
• It has inclined to believe that understanding key principles of CPTED, that is suited to the public 
realm rather than contemporary anti-terrorism design strategies, will support the main idea of thesis, 
cooperation between crime prevention through environmental design and anti-terrorism principles 
will lead to more open strategies for society, with help of considering social interaction as a 
significant part of design processes. 
• The vitality of considering both urban design and civic design principles has been highlighted in this 
chapter. It has inclined to believe that civic and urban design will lead to secured places with help of 
humanizing security design principles and without a dramatic impact on the ‘image’ of the city. 
It has been outlined by chapter 1 that implementing all three strategies together, in search of creating 
‘invisible’ security, can be successfully achieved in a scale of a site, rather than the scale of a single 
building. According to this, chapter 2 will describe a process of empirical research in order to 
highlight environmental features and spatial urban structures for safer environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 Empirical research for identifying environmental features and spatial 
urban structures for anti-terrorism design  
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2.1. Hypothesis and methodology for selected case studies: 
 
2.1.1. Research hypotheses formed by anti-terrorism design and CPTED principles 
 
As has been mentioned in introduction, research related to urban forms encloses two different parts 
and two different approaches to the issue. First part, a questionnair based survey, is aiming on 
identifying urban elements and forms, firmly connecting with terror attacks, while second part of a 
research is more related to road network reorganization strategies. 
After analysing existing literature and recent researches about anti-terrorism design, CPTED 
strategies, urban and civic design principles, research hypothesis has been formed.   
• Physical and natural barriers, preventing access to vulnerable targets, can elude potential 
threat; 
• Increasing standoff distance by dispersing same functional buildings close to each other, 
will diminish a chance of terror attacks; 
• Reduced number of vehicle access points to the building, as well as separation between 
vehicle and pedestrian flows, will evade a possible threat.  
• Considering security design principles for parking lots, will elude potential danger from 
vehicles; 
• Site that is constantly monitored, will less likely turn into a venue of terror attack; 
• Site surrounding with open space can provide the area with natural surveillance and easy 
detection of potential offenders; 
• Avoiding areas, where offender can hide without being detected by natural or continues 
surveillance, can decrease the chance of terror attacks; 
• Well-used site, with diversity of activities and functional zones, will determine choice of 
places for terror attacks.  
• Site with a strong separation between private and public properties, as well as activities, is 
less likely turning into a terrorist target object; 
• Putting unsafe activities in vulnerable site, will turn it into attractive target for terrorists;  
 
• High integrated roads, with a lot of connector roads, can determine choice of places for terror 
attacks.  
63 
 
• Site with direct access to the main street, as well as to the city center can be turned into the 
venue for terror attacks; 
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2.1.2. Empirical research methodology 
 
Turning into the methods that have been used to carry out empirical field research. Main task of this 
chapter is to test hypotheses formed after reviewing anti-terrorism, CPTED, civic and urban design 
literature. Research comprises two different approaches to the issue: first part “identifies 
environmental design (CPTED) features that influence choice of places for terrorist attacks, as for 
second part it identifies factors of spatial urban structure that influence choice of places for terror 
attacks” (Matijosaitiene and Petriashvili, 2017). These two ways of investigation require 
implementation of various methodologies.  
Research starts with collecting data for selected research objects: main target buildings, purpose of 
an attack, program on the site, organizing zoning plan, and etc.  
 
For carrying out first part of a research, CPTED questionnaire has been developed based on the site 
assessment checklist (CPTED) and FEMA guidelines. Questionnairer has 39 ‘Yes’/’No’ type 
questions, organized according to CPTED key strategies (elements of surveillance, elements of 
access control and target hardening, elements of territoriality, elements of activity support, elements 
of site management and maintenance). For assessing selected sites and getting precise results, field 
research has taken following steps: 
• gathering aerial pictures of selected sites, street views and information about attacks 
provided by various articles; 
• observing site for no less than 10 minutes and assessing all environmental features from the 
questioner by giving “Yes” or “No” answers. “Yes” when element meets security design 
principles and “No” when they do not.  
• using correlation analysis in search of identifying CPTED elements related to terror attach; 
• using automatic regression to build a prediction model for terror attacks. 
• applying descriptive statistics to outline weakest design areas of analysed objects, that has 
been affected by terror attacks.   
Tools that has been used for carrying out first part of a research are the following: 
articles/publications; Google Earth Pro; IBM SPSS statistics software.  
The main aim of the second part of this research is to identify factors of spatial urban structure, 
influencing choice of places by terrorists, has been carried out with help of Space Syntax (SS) visual 
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analysis. In search of discovering urban features that can be a cause of choosing particular sites for 
terror attacks while avoiding others, all major space organizing attributes have taken into account: 
connectivity, choice, mean depth and integration. (connectivity measures how many roads are 
connected to particular road segment; choice measures how likely a street segment is passed through 
all shortest routes from all spaces to each segment; mean depth is a distance form each road segment 
center point until other streets segment center points; integration measures number of turns that is 
required to get from one street segment to other street segments.) 
The process of space analysis comprises following steps: 
• deciding on 8-meter radius spaces for analysis around terror attack venues; 
• creating relevant working maps (maps with single lines instead of polylines) of a selected 
city with marked attack points; 
• using a Depth Map software for investigating attributes: connectivity, integration, choice, 
and mean depth 
• using axial map analysis (axial map analysis is implemented on an accurate map. It draws 
intersected lines on urban grid in order to cover all grids and indicates rings of circulation).  
Tools that have been used for carrying out second part of a research are the following: DepthMap 
software and AutoCad for creating accurate maps.  
After acquiring relevant results from both parts of a research, thesis will form appropriate 
conclusions and build up a conceptual model for terrorism resilient urban patterns. 
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2.1.3. Case studies and research objects 
According to the recent terrorist cases, decision was made on choosing and analyzing sites are 
located in Europe: Brussel, Liege, Oslo, Paris, Volgograd, Diyarbakir, and Stockholm as well as 
some sites in Asia (mostly cities that have European city planning principles) Such as: Ankara, 
Istanbul and Tel-Aviv. All of these above-mentioned cities were used for first part of the research as 
for second part decision was made on Brussel, Ankara, Istanbul and Tel-Aviv. Difference in number 
of analysed cities has been caused by different requirements for researches.  Questionnaire based 
survey required analysing more sites for more accurate and truthful results, while Space syntax 
analysis could have been done for a few number of sites. Following terror attack cases have been 
evaluated by means of site function, purpose of attack and target objects.  
It is important to be mentioned that all chosen cases are either suicide bombings, mass shooting, car 
bombing or all together. (Table 21; 22; 23; 24; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 210; 211; 212; 213; 214) 
 
Table 21 Case study: Ankara, central railway station. Illustration prepared by author 
 
Location Turkey, Ankara 
Target object Ankara central railway station 
Year of an attack 2015, October 10th 
Methods of an 
attack 
Suicide Bombing 
Purpose of an 
attack 
Political (Targeted Protestants) 
Loss 109 dead and 400+ injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Public buildings: railway station, 
stadiums/sport hall, governmental 
office, parks 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
In that particular situation, it was the 
venue of a strike 
Site’s occupants 
and visitors 
Civilians using site for public 
purposes, Students and politicians 
67 
 
Table 22 Case study: Ankara, bus stop. Illustration prepared by author 
 
Table 23 Case study: Ankara, military headquarter. Illustration prepared by author 
 
Location Turkey, Ankara 
Target object Bus stop 
Year of an attack 2016, March 13th 
Methods of an attack Car bombing, Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Political (main target: security forces) 
Loss 37 dead and 127 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Governmental offices, Public work 
department, Shopping malls, banks and 
financial offices, (nearby: Ankara 
station, metro station, parks) 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Area is a major transportation hub of 
the city, presented with number of bus 
stops. In addition to this it is a crossroad 
of major bus lines 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians and politicians 
 
Location Turkey, Ankara 
Target object Military headquarter 
Year of an attack 2016, February 17th 
Methods of an attack Suicide Bombing, car bombing 
Purpose of an attack Political (Target Military personnel) 
Loss 28 dead and 60 injured  
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Headquarter of the army and Turkish 
parliament, Residential district with 
headquarter of high ranking military 
personnel, (nearby: stadium) 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Site is mainly used for military 
purposes 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Military personnel, politicians, civilians 
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Table 24 Case study: Brussels, Maalbeek station. Illustration 
prepared by author 
Location Belgium, Brussels 
Target object Transport Hub, Maalbeek station 
Year of an attack 2016 March 22nd 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing, mass shooting 
Purpose of an attack Political 
Loss 35 dead and 340 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Station, close to number of EU 
institutions, Governmental buildings 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Site is mainly used for business and 
political purposes 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
EU commission members, civilians, 
politicians 
Table 25 Case study: Liege, St. Lamberts square. Illustration 
prepared by author 
Location Belgium, Liege 
Target object Saint Lambert Square 
Year of an attack 2011 December 13th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing, mass shooting 
Purpose of an attack Unknown 
Loss 7 dead and 125 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Town’s court building, Museum, Saint 
lamberts castle, bank offices 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Site has tourist attraction spots _tourism 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians, tourists 
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Table 26 Case study: Istanbul, Istaklal avenue. Illustration prepared by author 
Location Turkey, Istanbul  
Target object Shopping area, Istiklal Ave. 
Year of an attack 2016 March 19th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Unknown 
Loss 4 dead and 36 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Shopping malls, various entertainment 
venues, restaurants, governmental 
buildings, mosque 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Shopping, leisure activities 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians, mostly foreign tourists 
Table 27 Case study: Tel-Av-Iv. Illustration prepared by author 
Location Turkey, Tel-Av-Iv 
Target object Small businesses 
Year of an attack 2016 (January 1st) 
Methods of an attack Mass shooting 
Purpose of an attack Unknown 
Loss 3 dead and 7 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Various public buildings_ restaurants, 
cafes, small businesses. Mostly 
entertainment spots. 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Leisure activities 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians, tourists 
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Table 28 Case study: Ankara military headquarter.  
Illustration prepared by author  
Location Russia, Volgograd 
Target object Trolleybus 
Year of an attack 2013 December 30th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Unknown 
Loss 16 dead and 85 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Residential district small private 
businesses 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Daily activities, living areas  
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Residents, civilians 
Table 29 Case study: Istanbul, Sultan Ahmet dist.  
Illustration prepared by author 
Location Turkey, Istanbul 
Target object Istanbul historic Sultan Ahmet dist.  
Year of an attack 2016 January 12th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Both political and religious 
Loss 13 dead and 14 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Museums, Governmental offices, 
Obelisk of Theodosius, Mosque 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Tourist attraction site 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Mostly tourists 
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Table 210 Case study: Diyarbakir, governmental offices. 
 Illustration prepared by author 
Location Turkey, Diyarbakir 
Target object Governmental offices 
Year of an attack 2015 June 5th 
Methods of an attack Bombing 
Purpose of an attack 
Political, target group: People’s 
democratic party supporters 
Loss 4 dead and 100+ injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Mosque, Commercial buildings, 
University, governmental offices,  
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
In that particular situation, there was an 
electoral rally of the people’s 
democratic party. 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians 
Table 211 Case study: Paris, ‘Stade de France’. Illustration prepared by author 
Location France, Paris 
Target object Stadium of France “Stade de France” 
Year of an attack 2015 November 13th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Political 
Loss 137 dead and 368 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Stadiums, leisure center, hotels 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Public building, venue of gathering  
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Tourists, civilians 
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Table 212 Case study: Paris, boulevard Voltaire. Illustration prepared by author 
Location France, Paris 
Target object Boulevard Voltaire 
Year of an attack 2015 November 13th 
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Political 
Loss 137 dead and 368 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Mixed use shopping and entertainment 
places 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Shopping, tourist attraction spots 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians, tourists 
 
Table 213 Case study: Oslo, governmental headquarter. Illustration prepared by author  
Location Norway, Oslo 
Target object  Governmental headquarter 
Year of an attack 2011 July 22nd 
Methods of an attack Car bombing, mass shooting 
Purpose of an attack Political 
Loss 77 dead, 319 injured 
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Governmental, residential 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Political 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Politicians 
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Table 214 Case study: Sweden, boulevard Voltaire. Illustration prepared by author 
Location Sweden, Stockholm 
Target object Drottninggatan, shopping street 
Year of an attack 2010 December 11th  
Methods of an attack Suicide bombing 
Purpose of an attack Unknown 
Loss 2 dead  
Buildings primary 
purposes 
Shopping centers 
Critical activities 
take place at the 
buildings 
Shopping 
Site’s occupants and 
visitors 
Civilians 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusions, research can point out main aspects of recent terrorist attacks. It is a vivid fact, that 
analysed attack cases are mainly performed by politically motivated aggressors. Consequently, 
target objects are mostly governmental headquarters. Although, number of cases happened in 
cultural districts or touristic areas as well as in transportation hubs.  
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2.2.  Research on environmental design (CPTED) features influencing choice of places for 
terror attacks: 
2.2.1.  Questionnaire based research process 
In all above-mentioned cities, a terror attack venues have evaluated by ‘Yes/No’ questionnaire. The 
questionnaire designed based on analysed literature as well as CPTED site assessment checklists and 
FEMA Guidelines for counterterrorism principles. 38 questions are organized in 5 different blocks, 
according to 5 key CPTED strategies:   
1) Elements of surveillance:  
Variable 1. Does site or object surrounded by an open space? 
Variable 2. Does site or object can be seen from every corner? 
Variable 3. Are there any blind spots or hidden areas? 
Variable 4. Does landscape create blind or hidden spots? 
Variable 5. Are there any blind walls? 
Variable 6. Are there any place where offenders could easily hide and conceal themselves? 
2) Elements of access control and target hardening: 
Variable 7. Does site have a direct access to the main street? 
Variable 8. Are there multiple entrances and exits to and from the site? 
Variable 9. Does most of major building in the site has separated entrances for vehicles and for 
people respectively? 
Variable 10. Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control elements at the perimeter of the site? 
Variable 11. Are there enough and appropriate perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles? 
Variable 12. Can high speed vehicle directly penetrate to major buildings situated on the site? 
Variable 13. Does the site’s road system prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles? 
Variable 14. Does the site landscaping and street furniture provide hidden places? 
Variable 15. Are hardening elements hidden from potential offender sight? 
Variable 16. Are bollards and street furniture creating a hidden layer of defense? 
Variable 17. Are there any signs controlling vehicle and pedestrian flow? 
Variable 18. Is there security/police presence on the site? 
Variable 19. Are vehicle access points to the building minimalized? 
3) Elements of territoriality: 
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Variable 20. Does the design provide a continuous line of defense around the site as far from the 
building as possible? 
Variable 21. Is distance from the building and site boundaries maximized? 
Variable 22. Do businesses and buildings identified by wall signs? 
Variable 23. Are property lines and private areas defined with plantings, pavement treatments, short 
walls, fences as well as bollard system? 
Variable 24. Are trees and plants creating second layer of site defense? 
Variable 25. Are parking areas clearly marked and separated from pedestrian walkways? 
4) Elements of site management: 
Variable 26. Are public toilets, service spaces or access to stairs, elevators located in any non-
secure areas? 
Variable 27. Is access to private and public space clearly defined? 
Variable 28. Are there any governmental, military or recreational facilities that impact 
transportation? 
Variable 29. Is there any medical institution nearby the site? 
Variable 30. Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and parked vehicle? 
Variable 31. Does site have a direct access to the city center? 
5) Elements of activity support: 
Variable 32. Are public and private activities separated? 
Variable 33. Is the site well-used? 
Variable 34. Is there a diverse range of land-uses on the site? 
Variable 35. Are there many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area? 
Variable 36. Does the site has political or religious values or both together? 
Variable 37. Are there restaurants/cafes/cinemas/play areas to attract people? 
Variable 38. Is the site frequently a venue of public activities? 
 
After the questions were filled, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers were given numeric values. ‘Yes’-1, when 
site meets security design standards; ‘No’-0, when site do not meet security design standards. 
Although, structure of some questions (when answer ‘Yes’ on the question is negative and ‘No’ 
positive) requires opposite values. (Yes-0; No-1)  
Results from questioner later analysed with:  
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• data comparison diagrams (assessed only those sites, affected by terror attacks); 
• data correlation analyses. 
In total 14 sites with terror attack and 21 sites without terror attack cases have been assessed with 
CPTED questionnaire. It is important to compare urban elements in areas that has been affected by 
terror attacks to the areas that has not affected by attacks to define degree of association with 
nominal variable to the number of terror attacks.  
Owing to the fact that data provided by questioner (Yes/No questions) is nominal, Eta-square and 
Chi-square analyses were being carried out. In another word “for the identification of relations 
between nominal variables (elements of urban environment from the questionnaire that can be 
answered ‘Yes’ or ‘No’) and scale variables (number of terror attacks) Eta-squared correlation 
analysis and Chi-squared test are applied” (Matijosaitiene and Petriashvili, 2017).  
A measure of association Eta-squared “correlation value ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no 
association between the row and column variables and values close to 1 indicating a high degree of 
association between the variables” (IBM Knowledge Center). Eta-square correlation analysis has 
chosen, because one variable in this case environmental design features are from categorical group 
while number of terrorism cases are from quantitative group. “Eta is appropriate for a dependent 
variable measured on an interval scale (interval and ratio variables are combined in the scale 
variable in SPSS) and an independent variable with a limited number of categories” (IBM 
Knowledge Center). Small correlation is being observed at η2=0.02, medium correlation is when 
η2=0.13, large correlation is when η2=0.26. As for Chi-squared test (with another name ‘Pearson’s 
chi-square test’ or ‘chi-square test of association) is relevant to use in cases, when it is required to 
identify if there is a significant relation between two or more categorical variables (represented by 
2X2 table), in this case between urban elements. After correlation analysis, a liner regression 
analysis has been implemented in order to predict the value of one variable (Environmental 
element), that based on the value of another variable (number of terror attacks). Results from liner 
regression analysis will be discussed later in the text. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) was used for carrying out this research. 
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2.2.2. Results from data correlation analysis 
 
To outline main environmental design features (assessed by CPTED questioner) that can be 
determinant factors for choosing a specific area for terror attacks, quantitative results from ‘Yes/No’ 
questioner have been examined with Eta-squared correlation analysis (η2). In addition to this Chi-
square tests are applied (χ2). According to results from correlation analysis, there is a relation 
between terror attacks and following environmental design factors (Table 1) (η2 Eta-square; χ2 Chi-
square; p(1) 2-sided significance ; p(2) significance)(table 3):  
• A strong separation of private and public activities is connected to terror attacks (χ2=14.583, 
p=0.00<0.05 and η2=0.521, p=0.00<0.05). A strong separation of public activities from private 
businesses can make them easier to be controlled and secured. However, with the actuality of 
retail activities separate entrances that on itself controlled independently can be understood as 
one of counterterrorism as well as CPTED principles. Private areas should be defined by small 
fences and site boundaries. A strong separation between private and public areas will reduce 
crime rate and terrorist activities respectively. 
• A site that has a direct access to the main street is connected to terror attacks (χ2=4.762, 
p=0.029<0.05, η2=0.170, p=0.029<0.05). When the site has an easy access to the main street, 
it means it is located in a major area of the city and the interest on it is quite significant. 
Consequently, in most cases this feature can be associated with terror attack.  
• A site that has a multiple entrances and exits are more likely to turn into the target of terror 
attacks (χ2=5.250, p=0.022<0.05, η2=0.188, p=0.021<0.05). Multiple number of entrances and 
exits to and from the site is associated with vulnerable and not terrorism resistant areas. 
According to FEMA guidelines a site should have two entrances and exits (one of them for 
emergency purposes) (FEMA 430, 2007).  
• Minimization of vehicle access points to the building is connected to terror attacks (χ2=5.000, 
p=0.025<0.05 and η2=0.333, p=0.024<0.05). Controlling all existing vehicle access points is 
necessary for anti-terrorism design. Although, minimalizing number of accesses to the object 
can diminish chances of an attack and therefore, will give us a possibility to make a minimum 
standoff distance. 
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• Access to private and public space is clearly defined (χ2=6.087, p=0.014<0.05, η2=0.217, 
p=0.012<0.05). Finishes and signage should be designed for visual simplicity in order to define 
private, semi-public and public spaces.   
• When a site has a direct access to the city center it more likely turns into a target of terror 
attacks (χ2=6.300, p=0.012<0.05, η2=0.225, p=0.011<0.05). According to the research, a site 
that has a direct access to the city center is considered as an important area. Owing to the fact 
that terrorist’s main aim is to attack ‘soft’ targets and achieve huge number of causalities, city 
centers and major roads mostly turning into venues of terror attacks.  
• Site is well used (χ2=6.087, p=0.014<0.05 and η2=0.217, p=0.012<0.05). Well used site means 
it has many visitors. Crowded places are always hard to control, consequently this 
circumstance can turn it into an unsafe place and attractive target for terrorists.   
• Redistribution of same functional buildings on the site can turn the area into the venue of terror 
attack (χ2=7.337, p=0.014<0.05 and η2=0.217, p=0.012<0.05). Governmental districts, 
cultural districts can turn into an easy target for terrorist organization. As far as same functional 
buildings are redistributed in the same area.  
• A presence of a medical institution nearby the site is related to the choice of place for the 
terror attack (χ2=7.350, p=0.007<0.05 and η2=0.490, p=0.004<0.05) (Matijosaitiene and 
Petriashvili, 2017) 
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Table 3 Highlighted urban features and their correlation with terror attack cases. (Table prepared by the 
author).  
 
 Urban Environment factors  Terrorism 
 
Site has a direct access to the main street 
χ2=4.762, 
 p=0.029<0.05, 
 η2=0.170,  
p=0.029<5 
There are multiple entrances and exits to and from the site 
χ2=5.250,  
p=0.022<0.05,  
η2=0.188,  
p=0.021<5 
Vehicle access points to the building is minimalized 
χ2=5.000 
p=0.025<0.05 
η2=0.333 
p=0.024<0.05 
 
A medical institution is presented nearby the site   
χ2=7.350 
p=0.007<0.05 
η2=0.490 
p=0.004<0.05 
 
Public and private activities are separated 
χ2=14.583, 
p=0.00<0.05 and 
η2=0.521, 
p=0.00<0.05 
Site is well used 
χ2=6.087, 
p=0.014<0.05 
η2=0.217, 
p=0.012<0.05 
Many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area 
χ2=7.337, 
p=0.014<0.05 
η2=0.217, 
p=0.012<0.05 
 
Access to private and public space is clearly defined 
χ2=6.087, 
p=0.014<0.05, 
η2=0.217, 
 p=0.012<5 
 
 
Site has a direct access to the city center 
χ2=6.300,  
p=0.012<0.05, 
η2=0.225, 
p=0.011<5 
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The following graphic demonstrate how important variable 8, 20, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34 and variable 36 
are for the whole model of predictions of terror attacks (figure 11). (Variable 8, question 2.2. Are 
there multiple entrances and exits to and from the site; variable 20, question 2.14. Vehicle access 
points to the buildings are minimized; Variable 30, question Is there any medical institution nearby 
the site?; Variable 33, question Are public and private acivities separated?; Variable 36, question 
Are there many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area?) 
 
Figure 11  Importance of variables for the choice of places for terror attacks (Illustration prepared by 
author) 
According to the graph variables 33 and 36 have shown a strong correlation with terror attacks, that 
means elements of activity supports and site functioning are a determinant factor related to the 
choice of terror attacks. Both features can be successfully implemented in counterterrorism deign 
strategies. 
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2.2.3. Results from comparative analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
Later, results from obtained data (‘Yes/No’ CPTED questioner) has been evaluated with 
comparative analysis. Process of analysing data with descriptive statistics, highlighted some 
environmental features that has or has not a significance connection with the terror attack. In order 
to get more precise results, questions that has vivid disproportional answers have been selected 
(When negative answer>Positive answer). Those questions are following: 
Negative responses from sites with terror attack cases: 
Does the site or object surrounded by an open space? (Var.1) (4 positive/10 negative); 
Site has a direct access to the main street. (Var.7) (1 positive/13 negative); 
Are there multiple entrances and exits to and from the site? (Var.8) (4 positive/10 Negative); 
Is there security police presence at the site? (Var.19) (4 positive/10 negative); 
Vehicle access points to the building are minimalized; (Var.20) (3 positive/ 11 negative); 
Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and site boundaries? (Var. 31) (4 
positive/10 negative); 
The site has a direct access to the city center. (Var. 32) (1 positive/ 13 negative); 
Are public and private activities separated? (Var. 33) (1 positive/13 negative); 
Is the site well-used? (Var. 34) (0 positive/ 14 negative); 
 Are there many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area? (Var. 36) (2 
positive/12 negative); 
Are there restaurants, cafes, cinemas, play areas to attract people? (Var. 38) (3 positive /11 
negative); 
Is the site frequently a venue of public activities? (Var. 39) (4 positive /10 negative). 
Descriptive statistics has shown that most of the site with terror attacks were surrounded by open 
space. We can deduce that even though open space can be beneficial for architectural point of view 
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(for maximizing standoff distance, or easily redistributing blast loads) this particular feature can 
determine terrorist attacks and the choice of a particular area.  
A similar explanation can be made for a Variable 2; when the site is located on the major road, its 
importance is higher, so as its asset value. 
As it has been stated by counterterrorism principles site should have no more than two controlled 
accesses points. Descriptive statistics have shown that 10 sites out of 14 has multiple entrances to 
and from the site. Consequently, this circumstance can be considered as a determinant factor of an 
attack. 
Almost none of examined places had any nearby police stations. 
Variable 20 showed that most cases had easy vehicular access points that therefore rises 
vulnerability rate of a building. 
Setback distance has also highlighted a common problem: not existence of sufficient standoff 
distance from the building and site boundaries turns the object into an easy target for terrorists.  It 
turned out that just 4 sites out of 10 have sufficient standoff distances (variable 31).  
The choice of venues of an attack could also be determined by their easy access to the city center. 13 
sites out of 14 have a direct access to the center (variable 32). Data analysis has shown that 
separated public and private activities can be a reason for terror attacks (variable 33). 
11 terror attack cases out of 14 have occurred in areas with clear zoning plan (variable 36); 
According to the responses a high percentage of sites with terror attack cases are important among 
civilians by their functions (Public entertainment venues: restaurants, cinemas, theaters etc.) (var. 
38, var. 39 and 34).  
Comparative data analysis and descriptive statistics has also carried out for places with no terror 
attacks. However, in this case, selection was made on design and urban elements that has more 
positive responses than negative (Positive answers>Negative answers). 
Positive responses from sites without terror attack cases: 
 Are public and private activities separated? (Var. 33) (16 positive/ 5 negative); 
 Are there many same functional buildings redistributed in the surrounding area? (Var. 36) (16 
positive/ 5 negative); 
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Analysis on sites with appropriate design elements for meeting counterterrorism principles, has 
highlighted 2 variables that are more common for defendable places. In details, 16 out of 10 places 
had no significant separation of private and public activities. In addition to that most sites had a 
diversity of functions.  
The results from descriptive statistics of sites with terror attacks are strongly correlated with pre-
vious research of data correlation analysis. Consequently, some similar environmental features can 
be identified in the data provided by a comparative analysis of a questionnaire to correlation analysis 
results. This data will therefore highlight most important elements that should be implemented into 
design, such are: entrances to and from the building, vehicle access points to the building, direct 
access to the city center, and separation of public and private activities, well-used site and same 
functional buildings redistribution in the surrounding area. 
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2.3. Research on spatial urban structure factors that influence choice of places for terror 
attacks: 
2.3.1. Process of syntactical analysis 
Second part of a research, starts with making maps (defining 8 km radius from attack points) for the 
following cities and its sites: Ankara (G. Mustafa Kemal Blvd.); Ankara 2016 February (Military 
headquarter); Ankara 2016 March (Ataturk Blvd.); Brussel 2016 (Maelbeek Metro Station); Istanbul 
2016 (Istiklal avenue); Tel-Aviv 2016 (Dizengoff street); 
Owing to the fact that a lot of cities after terror attacks have risen security levels by implementing 
counterterrorism design strategies in their vulnerable sites, making precise maps for syntactical 
analysis become a difficult task for a research. Consequently, decision was made on few sites, that 
has recently been affected by terror attacks.  
Initially thesis will define general ideas of space syntax (SS), and the decision of choosing syntactic 
analysis for identifying specific urban structure factors. SS, main aim is to establish a relation 
between a spatial structure of cities and buildings with its user’s behavior and their movement in a 
space. It seeks to reveal both the logic of architectural space at any scale and the spatial logic of 
spaces. 
Studies on site maps for SS analysis, was performed by Depth Map software. For an urban scale, it 
is relevant to use axial map analysis, that is inclined to believe one of a key tool of SS. Initially, 
prepared maps are transformed into axial maps. Axial map allows researchers to create consistent 
maps with a concise description of a space. Axial maps are beneficial for the analysis of pedestrian 
movement patterns and various activities, that are related to this movements. (Hillier, 2004).  
It is relevant to investigate SS key attributes in a different scale (in this case, local and global 
scales). “The scale is recorded in terms of a radius, centered on the segment in question, measured in 
metric distance” (Emo 2012). Graph analysis was being applied by global and local measures for 
site evaluation. Global radius N, that is largest possible radius and local radiuses has been selected: 
n, n2, n3 and n5. Those radiuses related to different scales of movement starting from most local 
ending with most global. In addition to that, it uses three different ideas of movement: “shortest path 
distance, fewest turns distance and least angle change distance” (Hillier and Stonor, 2010). For 
instance, global integration with radius n, shows how in a city each street is connected to all other 
streets in terms of the maximum possible direction changes. Integration with radius 2, shows how a 
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particular street is connected to other neighborhood streets in terms of 2 times direction change, in 
case of radius 3 and 5, 3 times direction change or 5 times direction change.  
The most significant attributes for syntactical analysis has defined in advance, those are following: 
• Choice (is calculated by mathematical ‘betweenness) discovers, how likely is a particular 
street chosen to get to other segments in a space.  Measuring choice value for the street, 
where terror attack occurred, will give us an idea of relationship between a value of choice 
and terror attack causalities; 
• Connectivity, discovers street values by means of its connector roads. Measuring 
connectivity attribute for the street, where the terror attack occurred, will give us an idea 
weather roads with significant number of connectors are turning into a terrorist target or not; 
• integration, (calculated by mathematical ‘closeness’) discovers how easy is it to get to a 
street segment from other street segments. Measuring integration value in the area of terror 
attack will give us an idea of relationship between highly integrated streets and terror attack 
causalities; 
• Mean depth and Total Depth, “is calculated by assigning a depth value to each space 
according to how many spaces it is away from the original space” (Hillier and Hanson, 
1984). Those attributes on itself will identify how deep are street segments in relation with 
terror attack venues. (Hillier and Stonor, 2010; Hillier and Hanson, 1984). 
In search of carrying out a research, for identifying terrorist movements and their choices of 
particular places, axial map analysis have been carried out. Analysis considered a 2D layout model.  
Comparison of different SS attributes, by means of different cities, highlighted spatial urban 
structure factors that can have a significant relation with choosing a specific area for terror attacks. 
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2.3.2. Results from space syntax analysis 
 
SS visual analysis of cities with recent terror attacks has pointed out some elements and urban 
features that might be the factor affecting the choice of specific area for terror attacks while avoiding 
others. Redistribution of a street network has come out a key factor while planning resilient cities.  
A trustworthy result is determined by getting almost same illustrations of research sites axial 
analysis. However, Tel-Aviv was the only city where terrorist attack site was not located on the 
most integrated street, though it had quite high choice as well as local integration value. For better 
illustration table of important attribute for different areas has prepared (Table 4) 
SS attributes/Cities Ankara 2015 
Ankara 
2016, Feb. 
Ankara 2016 Brussel Tel Aviv Istanbul 
Choice [HH] 166096 257256 214618 785283 90731 375728 
Choice [HH]R2 65 905 187 1329 211 413 
Choice [HH]R3 786 5432 1374 9895 1790 1811 
Choice [HH]R5 17491 45671 14409 125560 15683 11124 
Connectivity 16 31 15 38 16 21 
Integration[HH] 1.05396 1.10706 0.941496 1.68477 1.4472 0.636022 
Integration[HH]R2 4.06308 5.96341 4.67173 6.2915 1.84996 5.36218 
Integration[HH]R3 3.07462 3.79913 3.24801 4.04356 3.40704 3.26735 
Integration[HH]R5 2.27004 2.22211 2.26146 2.67907 2.39621 2.18475 
Mean Depth[HH] 9.74148 9.1423 10.9325 6.7091 6.11157 15.7976 
Mean Depth[HH]R2 1.84746 1.71818 1.78571 1.7697 1.8139 1.63793 
Mean Depth[HH]R3 2.65306 2.4125 2.53297 2.53968 2.57676 2.35772 
Mean Depth[HH]R5 4.03688 3.73059 3.93929 4.0537 3.92095 3.57143 
Table 4 SS important attributes numeric values for streets, affected by a recent terror attacks.  
Axial map visual comparison by means of choice, connectivity, integration, and mean depth 
attributes, have pointed out that almost all examined terror attack sites are situated on a globally 
integrated road, with the radius N. (Figure 12,13) 
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Figure 12 Illustration of global integration maps for research object sites. A terror attack venues are marked 
as a red dot. Warm color (Red, orange, yellow) lines mean the highest values of integration, and cold color 
(blue, green) lines mean the lowest values of integration. 
Ankara, October 2016 Brussels, 2016 
Ankara, February 2016 Ankara, March 2016 
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Figure 13 Illustration of global integration maps for research object sites. A terror attack venues are marked 
as a red dot. Warm color (Red, orange, yellow) lines mean the highest values of integration, and cold color 
(blue, green) lines mean the lowest values of integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Istanbul, 2016 Tel Aviv, 2016 
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2.4. Prognosis, main findings, and recommendations: 
2.4.1.  Prognosis model of the place choice for terror attacks, based on logistic regression analysis 
Using the logistic regression to the survey data (Yes/No answers, some prognosis models for 
particular variables (dependent variables) have been built. Urban features that we want to predict are 
dependent variables, as for number of terror attacks are values with the name independent variables. 
Independent variable is a predictor variable. This liner graphs can give us predictions on terror 
attacks in case of existence or not existence of particular variables. In addition to that it evaluates 
possibility of attacks from 0 to 1 scale that gives idea of its value (if prognoses number is closer to 1 
there is less chance of terror attacks, if it is close to 0 than there is a higher chance). 
Following graphs (Figure 14) are demonstrating the relation between Variables 40 -20 and variables 
40-33: negative relation between Variable 40 and Variable 33 (when public and private activities 
separated (answer yes=1) the estimated mean value of terror attacks is 0.24 (in the scale from 0 to 1, 
0.24 )and when the private and public activities are not separated (answer no=0), the prognosis mean 
value of terror attacks is 0.82 and positive relations between Variable 40 and Variable 20 (when 
Vehicle access points to the building is minimized (answer yes=1) the estimated mean value of 
terror attacks is 0.73, and when Vehicle access points to the building is not minimized (answer 
no=0) the estimated (prognosis) mean value of terror attacks is 0.33.  
Figure 14 Relation between dependent variables (environmental features) and independent variables 
(number of terror attacks). (Var. 20 Vehicle access points to the building is minimalized; var. 33 public and 
private activities are separated). 
A valuable information, provided by logistic regression analysis, is that variable 33 initially was trying 
to prove that, if private and public activities are separated, area won’t be affected by the threat of 
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terror. Whereas in fact prognoses shows that, if they are not strongly separated the probability of terror 
attack is less.  
The accuracy of these prognosis is 58.4%. However, it shows results that provide some insights for 
the future analysis of terrorism targets through urban planning factors. 
As for other variable prognoses. Data is provided for variables 8,30 and 36 (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15 Relation between dependent variables (environmental features) and independent variables 
(number of terror attacks). (Var. 8 there are multiple entry and exit points to and from the site; Var. 30 there 
are medical institutions nearby the site; Var. 36 many same functional buildings are redistributed in the 
surrounding area). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
2.4.2. Recommendations  
 
Some recommendations, that are based on case studies, prognosis, correlation, and SS analysis on 
possible choice of places for terrorist attacks are following: 
Recommendations for target selection: 
Case studies have highlighted following objects, that is recommended to protect against terrorism. 
Vulnerable objects are following: 
• governmental buildings; 
• religious objects; 
• tourist attraction spots; 
• entertainment and shopping venues; 
• transportation hubs; 
Recommendations for site reorganization: 
• while planning vulnerable sites it is recommended to avoid multiple entrances and exits to 
and from the site (for both vehicle and pedestrian paths);  
• vehicle access points to valuable buildings is recommended to be minimalized;  
• public and private activities is recommended not be separated, while planning terror resistant 
environment, while access to private and public buildings need to be strongly defined; 
• in a vulnerable site, many same functional buildings are recommended not to be redistributed 
in the same area. For instance, avoid planning governmental headquarters and etc.  
• parking areas is recommended to be clearly marked and separated from pedestrian 
walkways. 
• it is highly recommended to control all entry and exit points to and from the site.  
• it is also recommended to design open space around the building (for increasing standoff 
distance) and not around the site (for decreeing chance of getting to vulnerable target object 
with a little effort); 
• it is recommended to have both police presence on a vulnerable site as well as medical 
institution in case of emergency.  
Recommendations for street network reorganization: 
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• it is highly recommended for vulnerable targets not to have a direct access to the main street; 
• it also recommended that streets, where a potential target for terrorists is situated, not to have 
an easy access to the city center; 
• streets with high integration level, choice and connectivity values are unprotected against 
any potential threat, consequently it is recommended they to be reorganized; 
• it is recommended to make confusing cul-de-sac roads; 
• it is highly recommended to abolish some uncontrolled streets. 
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CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
 
In search of building up a relevant conceptual model and design strategies, both research parts have 
taken into account (Figure 16). 
Figure 16 Conceptual approaches and strategies. Illustration prepared by author 
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In addition to these, two strategical approaches for two recommendations have been developed.  
Prognoses model from regression analysis, as well as conclusions from case studies have been taken 
into account. Conceptual model foresees governmental buildings, religious objects, tourist attraction 
spots, entertainment and shopping venues and transportation hubs as attractive target objects for 
terrorist, that need to be reinforced with relevant design features, recommended by empirical 
research results. Conceptual model comprises hypothesis tested for anti-terrorism, CPTED urban 
and civic design principles and suggests following conceptual approach to the issue of urban 
planning and design for terrorism resilient cities (figure 16): 
Starting with the first strategy that is related to a spatial urban structure organization. Findings have 
proved that street network characteristics can turn a particular area into attractive target for 
terrorists, with maximum rate of success.  
First strategy can be achieved by considering following steps: 
• disconnecting some secondary roads from globally integrated roads. Closing them from 
vehicular access and reload with various activities for increasing urban life in neighborhoods 
(park/square, playground, weekend community market and etc.)  
• turn some secondary streets into one direction streets; 
• clearly mark exit and entry points to and from the site and provide vulnerable streets with 
natural as well as continues surveillance (this approach can be implemented fully or party in 
problematic urban areas); 
Expectation: 
• complex and confusing street network systems; 
• ease controlled streets; 
• redistributed integration and connectivity values to other streets. 
Turning into a second strategy that is related to collapsing existing zones and redistributing major 
buildings in different zones. Even though FEMA guidelines suggests that asset values should be 
disposed together so as it will be easier to achieve appropriate standoff distance (FEMA 430, 2007), 
findings have proved opposite.  
Second strategy can be achieved by considering following steps: 
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• choosing objects for functional exchange by starting evaluating their architectural, historical 
and cultural values; 
• redistributing vulnerable, same functional buildings in different zones (for instance, collapse 
governmental headquarter and propose some governmental offices in residential districts); 
Expectation: 
• redistributed asset values leading to more protected ‘soft’ targets; 
• reduced separation between private and public activities. 
As for parking lots, that have turned to be one of the most important and significantly correlated 
with terrorist attack cases, it will be organized far away from vulnerable objects. Either on an empty 
plot nearby the building or a common parking lot will be implemented in a larger scale.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
Main objectives of Chapter 2 were to test hypothesis and investigate important environmental design 
features and spatial urban structural forms that can be a determinant factor for choosing specific 
sites for terror attacks, while avoiding others. Following this, researches have highlighted some key 
elements. Designing them adequately will irreversibly rise a security level in problematic areas. It 
can be said that, there are variety of significant conclusions that can be done according to already 
acquired results from empirical field research.  
• According to the fact that thesis aims to rise security level in vulnerable areas, while hiding security 
design features behind aesthetically pleasant design elements, empirical research hypothesis has 
formed in order to diminish attack success rate on a site scale, with help of identifying urban 
elements, rather than architectural features. It tried to identify defenseless roads against terror 
attacks, also tried to investigate any possible relation between anti-terrorism design features and 
CPTED security design strategies. For instance: controlled vehicular access points to vulnerable 
objects, necessity of separated parking lots, importance of natural surveillance and etc. In addition to 
that it aimed to discover sophisticated anti-terrorism design principles and their strong or weak 
correlation with terror attack cases. For instance: separated parking lots, implementing anti-terrorism 
design features (bollards, trees, heavy elements and etc.) in road infrastructure, changes in a zoning 
plan, separating vehicle and pedestrian flows and etc.  
• Turning into summering up results from case studies, has pointed out that in European cities, 
politically valuable areas are more likely turning into targets of terror attacks. On Asian countries 
example, religion is the main determinant factor for stimulating attacks. In addition, in last few 
years, public areas, touristic places and transportation hubs have also been targeted by terrorists. 
Apart from this, case studies have highlighted that the most common method of an attack is either 
mass shooting or suicide bombing.  
• For urban space arrangement, research concluded that site should not have multiple entrances and 
exits, as far as it turns the area into vulnerable place. Moreover, controlling multiple exit and entry 
points is associated with a lot of expenses. Recent studies on terrorism cases, have highlighted the 
importance of reducing easy vehicular accesses to the site, as far as vehicles penetrating directly into 
the building or even bomb explosion by various means of transportation are quite common methods 
of an attack. According to the fact that most major cities are characterized with high density of cars, 
this factor, can be understood as European cities main problem. However, field research deduced 
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that vehicle access points to the vulnerable object should be minimalized. This feature is also 
associated with CPTED strategy of access control. Research has shown that some environmental 
elements from CPTED checklist also meet counterterrorism principles. For instance, the idea that 
access to private and public space should be clearly defined. Another highlighted environmental 
element is function of buildings and their redistribution in a surrounding area. According to FEMA 
guidelines, with clear zoning it is easier to achieve sufficient number of standoff distance, in 
addition to that, it is easier to reinforce complex as a whole unit, better than separate buildings. 
However, studies have shown that all recent terrorist attacks in Europe happened in districts were 
same functional buildings are redistributed close to each other. These circumstances can draw 
conclusions that dispersion of major buildings in a different zone can create extra safety layer and 
may reduce an asset value of an object.  
• Turning into elements of street network reorganization that has been analysed with help of space 
syntax method. Analyses on cities and sites of terror attacks, pointed out that streets with high 
integration level, choice and connectivity values are more likely turning into venues of attacks. In 
other words, it can be deduced that areas that has an easy access, with various combination of road 
networks that affects road integration values, should be turned into less accessible parts of the city, 
with complex way of infrastructural reorganization.  
• According to logistic regression analysis with accuracy of 58,4%, when vehicle access points to the 
building is minimalized the chance of terror attack is low. However, when public and private 
activities are separated the chance of terror attack is quite high. Same prognosis results have variable 
36. When many same functional buildings are redistributed in a surrounding are, as well as, when 
site has multiple exit and entry points, possibility of terror attack is relatively high. As for a variable 
30 ‘there are medical institutions nearby the site’ it can decrease a possibility of attacks. 
Next chapter will arrange findings, related to anti-terrorism design, combine them with CPTED, 
urban and civic design principles, so as to be relevant to implement into an experimental project. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Experimental project for anti-terrorism design interventions in Tbilisi 
central railway station case  
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3.1. Background information and factors influencing design processes: 
3.1.1. Target object selection for experimental design  
 
According to previous chapters, identifying critical infrastructure is crucially important in order to 
avoid upcoming hazards and unforeseen causalities. Knowing in advance what to protect, can elude 
an extreme infrastructural damage, as well as high percentage of victims. Case studies on number of 
terror attacks in urban structures and in particular, architecture object, has outlined critical 
infrastructures that need to be protected accordingly. Those are following: 
Governmental buildings, religious objects, tourist attraction spots, entertainment and shopping 
venues and transportation hubs.  
The first step of experimental design is identifying a vulnerable site in Tbilisi, a capital city of 
Georgia, that is being considered as a future potential target for terror attacks in this experimental 
project (though, there is no relevant information or statistical data to foreseen Tbilisi as a potential 
target for terrorists).  Initially, easy targets, that has been selected from previous researches has been 
marked on Tbilisi city map:  
• Governmental headquarter on Freedom square; 
• Boris Paichdze Dinamo Arena; 
• Main religious building: Sameba cathedral 
• Transportation hubs: Tbilisi Central Railway station, Vagzali square; Tbilisi international 
airport. 
• Tbilisi International Airport; 
                              
In order to identifying importance of particular streets that could be a potential terror attack venues, 
space syntax visual analysis have been carried out. For discovering urban features that can be a 
cause of vulnerability of a particular territory, following major space organizing attributes have 
taken into account: connectivity, choice and integration (mean depth attribute was ignored in target 
selection process, as far as it did not give us a significant result in a precious researches). Syntactical 
analysis identified Tbilisi street network pattern and people’s movement, determined by spatial 
urban structures. Tbilisi has been analysed in a similar way as Ankara, Tel-Aviv, Istanbul, Brussels 
(Figure 16) 
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Figure 16 Tbilisi city map syntactical analysis and highlighting possible vulnerable targets for terror attacks 
Warm color (Red, orange, yellow) lines mean the highest values of integration, and cold color (blue, green) 
lines mean the lowest values of integration. Red dot designates railway station. Illustration prepared by author 
However, in a chapter 2 empirical research part 3, SS analysis were carried out for the reason of 
identifying spatial urban structure factors, that influence choice of places for terror attacks, while in 
C.Dadiani str. 
Tsereteli ave. 
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chapter 3, SS method is used to compare potential vulnerable targets in the city by means of their 
spatial patterns and identify most critical streets of Tbilisi and closely disposed potential vulnerable 
target. According to the Figure 16, Tsereteli avenue, located horizontally south-east towards the 
railway station and north-west road C. Dadiani street has a high connectivity, integration and choice 
values. (Figure 16)  
Looking through recommendations, developed in a previous research, globally integrated streets 
with high values can turn the site into a vulnerable and a potential target for terror attacks. 
According to this, Tbilisi central railway station has been selected as an experimental design object 
for a thesis work.  
Apart from above mentioned determinant aspects, there are number of factors that should be taken 
into consideration. One of the most significant is the number of concentrated population and site 
users on railway station and surrounding territory. 
Another factor, that on itself determined choosing Tbilisi for implementing strategies and 
recommendations from previous researches, is that currently city is going through redevelopment 
processes. In details, Tbilisi city hall is working on a new zoning plan for the city. This 
circumstance gives us a possibility to change zoning in railway station site and suggest new 
approaches that could solve the problem of vulnerability.  
In order to reinforce decision on site selection, thesis provides relevant statistical data, that 
highlights difference between the impact of an attack in five urban forms: transportation hub, 
citizens/property, police, governmental 
buildings and businesses. From which, 
attacks on transportation hubs can lead 
to high number of casualties. (Figure 
17) 
 
Figure 17 2014 statistical data of terror attack sites and causalities. Source: Global Terrorism Database, 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the 
University of Maryland and Bloomberg analysis.  
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3.1.2. City infrastructural reorganization and public transport mobility on the site 
 
Starting with Tbilisi road infrastructure and its relation to the research object_ Tbilisi central ailway 
station. According to Figure 18, roads next to the railway station is one of the most important 
collector roads in the city, that on itself characterized with a high value of connectivity, integration 
and choice values (Figure 18).   
 
Figure 18 Tbilisi Road Infrastructure, classification arterial, collector and local roads. (Prepared by author) 
 
Turning into major city exit and entry points, Tbilisi has 5 major entrance and exits to and from the 
city, connected with main arterial roads. (Figure 19) In addition to this, there is also 20 alternative 
exit and entry points that are used rarely compared to those 5 major highways (Source: Tbilisi 
Transportation Company). 
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Figure 19 Main entry and exit points to and from the city. (Illustration Prepared by author) 
It is a significant fact to be mentioned that, Tbilisi central railway station can be understood as one 
of the major part of a multifunctional complex site. However, apart from train and long-distance 
commuters, site is also loaded with daily users of various means of public transportations. In details, 
railway station site is presented by major bus stops, mini bus stations as well as metro line 
intersections. It is relevant to mention here that according to the data, provided by GeoStat 
(Georgian Statistical Center) analysis on public transport user’s statistics from 2016, busses are most 
popular public transport solution with 363,2 million passengers per year. After bus, metro annually 
has 102.9 million users. (Figure 20)  
It also should be mentioned, that site comprises main intersection of underground subway Station 
Square, presenting with 3 entrances and exits, that directly connected with railway station ensemble 
(Figure 20). Subway is one of the main and the most flexible means of public transportation for 
Tbilisi citizens, especially after the sprawl of the city to peripheries, it has turned into the fastest and 
the most convenient connector of suburban areas to the city center, characterized with a huge 
number of daily users. Initially, it started functioning with 5 metro stops (Didube, Electrodepo, 
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Vagzali Square, Marjanishvili and Rustaveli) in 1966. Nowadays, presented with 22 stops (Figure 
20).  
Figure 20 Public transport variety and statistical data Source: GeoStat, Illustration prepared by author  
In addition to this, 
with monumental 
plazas in front of 
almost all metro 
entrances, it is a venue 
of a chaotic, 
irregulated outdoor 
trade (figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21 Plaza next to Vagzali square metro station. Source: Newspaper რეზონანსი (RezonansiAs  
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As for mini bus stations, it is spread all over the site, occupying plazas from both entrances. This 
chaotic configuration, following with unorganized flows of people, rises the importance of 
regulating different functional zones in a way to make controlling site with natural, as well as, 
continues surveillance possible (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22 Redistribution of Metro and Bus station on the site. Existing situation (Illustration prepared by 
author) 
Turning into major bus stops, it is significant to be mentioned that 6 main bus stops are located in 
front of main entrance of central station. According to urban planning principles, this circumstance 
ensures accessibility to the site that can be understood as an advantage of the site as well. Although, 
it rises vulnerability rate of a complex, as far as busses has a relatively close access to the building 
without monitoring (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23 Scheme of major bus stops. Prepared by author 
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3.1.3. Irregular Parking lots 
 
Turning into one of the most important issues of the area, parking lots density and traffic 
congestions, caused by the growth in number of private means of transportation. According to the 
data, officially registered cars in Tbilisi, makes up to 1.1 million, almost the same as the number of 
inhabitants, from which 100 000 cars has been counted on a daily street traffic (data provided by the 
National Statistics office of Georgia).  This circumstances, lead to the lack of parking lots and 
uncontrolled streets, where Jane Jacobs ‘eyes on the street’ theory is hard to be fulfilled, either with 
continuing or natural surveillance. On another hand, “controlling vehicle speed allows more time for 
surveillance, and it decreases the kinetic energy of a vehicle, thus lessening the resistance strength 
needed for a vehicle barrier.” (Peart, 2000) In this case, it is possible to use existing urban 
characteristic features offered by the site itself and turn them into elements of protection.  
Notwithstanding, presented parking organization in Railway station site, has no consideration of 
either anti-terrorism design, nor CPTED or urban design principles. There is no clear division 
between parking lots used by the visitors of the site and workers in the railway station. In addition to 
that, mini busses and busses for international and national routes has no separate plazas, leading to 
uncontrolled crowds of different facility users.  
Railway station parking lot is one of the main determinant factor of turning the building into an easy 
target for terrorist, by means of not existence of decent amount of perimeter control barriers (Figure 
24). 
Figure 24 Railway station section, illustrating existing situation of parking reorganization on the site; 
Source: Tbilisi City Hall 
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3.1.4. Destination of shopping 
 
Outdoor irregular trade has always been a drawback for the city of Tbilisi, arising number of social 
and economic problems. Historically, shopping directly on streets, has a medieval root. It has been 
emphasized in 21st century and now almost identifies as the characteristic of all contemporary cities. 
Accordingly, it is quite common to see illegal shopping close to transportation hubs, bus and metro 
stations and etc. (figure 25).  As has been mentioned in previous subparagraph, plazas next to the 
Metro entrances, have been occupied by traders, that on itself reflected into high concentration of 
people, users of subway and shoppers. It is a vivid fact that, this circumstance turns public places 
into chaotic areas. Neither natural nor continuing surveillance is possible, leading to unsecured 
crowded places and vulnerable targets for terrorists respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25 On the left old Tbilisi Bazar. Source: national archives of Georgia. On the right current situation, 
Axmeteli metro entrance. Photo taken by author.  
 
Figure 26 illegal trade and its association with city 
transportation infrastructure. Illustration prepared by author. 
 
 
Turning into a Vagzali square, that vividly facing up 
with problems, caused by uncontrolled under and over ground traders. Illustration of shopping 
classification in Vagzali square could be following (figure 27).  
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Figure 27 Typology of trade and its location on a site 1) illegal over ground trade; 2) Illegal underground 
trade; 3) official community market; 4) shopping mall in a railway station building. Illustration prepared by 
author) 
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3.1.5. Community context and urban life 
 
Literature analysis in a chapter 1, has highlighted the importance of considering community context 
while creating safe environment for civilians. Ignoring urban life while rising safety on the site, 
most probably will lead to ‘failed spaces’. Analysing existing program on the site, has shown that, 
there is a lack of facilities that can be used by civilians. Presented urban life is poor, with scattered 
facilities without any strong connections (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28 Urban life and public facilities on the site. Illustration prepared by author  
According to the figure 26, territory has almost no venue of entertainment. In conclusion, here can 
be said that site only offers an easy transportation facilities and provides a various shopping 
opportunities for its users. Shopping facilities obliquely associated with transportation respectively. 
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3.2. Research on the data necessary for design: 
3.2.1. Methodology of acquiring relevant information for design feature implementation 
 
Acquiring data necessary for design has been carried out by different methods and approaches. 
Important data has been provided by various organizations. Starting with calculating number of 
inhabitants in 200-meter radius (minimum evacuation distance) has been achieved with ArchGIS 
software by National Statistics Office of Georgia(GeoStat).    
Data related to number of busses and mini busses has been provided by Tbilisi Transport Company. 
Tbilisi transport company also provided information related to number of passengers from all three 
exit and entry points of Vagzali Metro station.   
The weakness of experimental design methodology is determined by not existing any official 
organization, possessing statistical data of traders and shoppers on the site. This circumstance is 
mainly determined by its illegal status.  
Turning into the methods of building up an existing site model, has been achieved with help of 
documents provided by National Archives of Georgia, comprising plans of underground passing’s 
next to the railway station. As for Tbilisi City Hall, provided topographical and zoning maps of 
Tbilisi as well as existing Railway Station project documentations (plans, sections, facades and etc.).  
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3.2.2. Results from site quantitative research  
 
As has been mentioned in a previous sub-paragraph quantitively research on railway station site 
users is general. However, it can give us an overview on probable number of causalities in case of 
any possible attacks. Data acquired with help of ArcGIS shows that in 200-meter radius (where 
starting point is Tbilisi central station building itself) static number of inhabitants is 3112 persons.   
Turning into data related to Vagzali metro station three entrance user’s calculations are following 
(table 5; figure 29): 
Date Week day Entrance 1 Entrance 2 Entrance 3 Sum 
03.10.2016 Monday 19460 10686 9762 39908 
03.10.2016 Tuesday 18892 10910 9854 39656 
03.10.2016 Wednesday 20196 10779 10061 41036 
03.10.2016 Thursday 18967 10690 10342 39999 
03.10.2016 Friday 18853 10463 9971 39287 
03.10.2016 Saturday 13963 6973 7397 28333 
03.10.2016 Sunday 15778 6518 8249 30545 
Table 5 Station square passenger’s calculation (3 entrance count) from October 3rd, 2016, Source: Tbilisi 
Transport company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 diagram of a site with marked 3 metro entrances and public bus locations on railway station site. 
Illustration prepared by author 
 
1 2 
3 
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Turning into the number of public bus and mini bus users in experimental design site is following 
(Table 6) 
 
Date Quantity of buses Quantity of trips Total number of passengers 
Tuesday/Saturday/Sunday 262 959 69223 
Table 6 Quantitative data on Station square busses and mini buses. Source: Tbilisi Transportation 
Company  
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3.2.3. Tbilisi historical layers and railway station site formation 
 
Tbilisi, a capital of Georgia, geopolitically abutting countries like Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Russia, has never been a destination of terror attacks. Even though it is located in central Asia, its 
urban structure is more related to European city patterns. Apart from this, city has gone through a 
migration flows from neighborhood regions, presented with 1.1 million inhabitants whereas in fact 
total number of civilians in a country is 3.7 million. (Data provided by Tbilisi City hall) 
In the middle of XIX century when train tracks have appeared in the city, Tbilisi started a rapid 
growth alongside the train line and a major core, Mtkvari river. It is a significant fact that the right 
bank of the river has been growing immensely compared to the left side, that was mainly caused by 
the importance of new railway station (Figure 30).  
Figure 30 Tbilisi formation from 1st half of XIX century until Now, highlighting importance of new railway 
station. Train tracks marked with red, Mtkvari river marked with blue. (prepared by author). 
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As for, Tbilisi railway station history, it dates back to 19th century. Original building was surrounded 
by a wide plaza, accessed by phaetons. 
During this time, infrastructure on the site 
has been formed, as well as the initial ideas 
of zoning has been developed, leading to a 
formation of regulated urban network. 
During this time, King Tamar street was 
narrow and insignificant, however in the 
middle of 20th century, it has become a 
strong core of the site as well as of the city 
(figure 31, figure 32). As for formation of 
residential districts in a surrounding 
territory, has not started until 20th century. 
Development of a new community was 
mainly determined by industrial revolution, 
following with reconstruction of significant 
number of factories that had been appeared 
around station building. 
 
 
 
Figure 31 Historical layers of site formation. K. Tamar street marked with a black dot. (Illustration prepared 
by author). 
During soviet times in Georgia, building has been reconstructed to better suit ‘Stalinist’ epoch. 
Consequently, in 1982, building and surrounding site has changed dramatically once again (figure 
31, figure 32). However, reconstruction processes procrastinated with the reason of Soviet Union 
collapse. Building had been occupied by refugees between the years 1992 and 1993.  
In 2008, new site reconstruction strategies have been developed. Idea was to strengthen connections 
between two sides of railway tracks, expressed with new building configuration.  
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Station building has been extended over railway tracks, serving railway station purposes. As for 
main building, it has been occupied by city’s main shopping hall. During this times, most factories 
have become abandoned or turned into residential buildings.   
 
1887                                      1914                                         1970                                 2017 
Figure 32 Historical pictures of railway station and its surrounding territory formation (Source: national 
Archives of Georgia)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Zoning and existing situation analysis 
 
According to the data provided by Tbilisi City Hall architecture office, major part of the railway 
station territory, comprises commercial zones, mainly determined by the fact that site is reloaded by 
transportation zones.  
Figure 33 shows, that a site has the lack of 
greenery and public open spaces. On one 
hand, this circumstance could be 
beneficial while keeping in mind anti-
terrorism design and previous case 
studies, that showed that public crowded 
places are more likely turning into targets 
of terror attacks than reinforced so called 
‘hard targets’. On another hand, avoiding 
public realm and ignoring public 
requirements, while concentrating only on 
security design, will irreversibly leads to 
spaces that are not used by people 
adequately.  
 
 
Figure 33 Zoning and site’s existing 
situation. Source: Tbilisi City hall, illustration 
prepared by author  
 
To conclude here, current situation in Vagzali square is characterized by uncontrolled flows. Site is 
used only for transportation and commercial purposes. 
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3.3. Conceptual approach to the issue of Railway Station reinforcement and design 
implementations: 
 
3.3.1.  Civic, urban design, CPTED and Anti-Terrorism design principles and the ways of 
consideration into railway station case. 
 
The necessity of collaboration between disciplines such are: urban design; crime prevention through 
environmental design and anti-terrorism design, has been highlighted in a chapter 1 of a thesis work. 
Although, chapter 2 tried to humanize anti-terrorism design strategies, by concentrating on 
environmental design (CPTED) features and spatial urban structure factors. It is relevant to mention 
that, "you can increase security to a point where you actually install fear, and then you have failed 
spaces" (Hockenberry 2006). According to this, spaces fail, when people are too scared to use it 
adequately. In most cases, following anti-terrorism design guidelines offering solutions without 
taking into consideration of primitive placemaking principles. Reinforcing building with blast 
resistant materials, putting up fences and closing ground floors for public with help of not really 
welcoming facades. On one hand, new findings (from chapter 2) with cooperation of CPTED 
security design principles will inevitable optimize safety and security of a public place, through 
some interventions. On another hand, considering only security design aspects, will inevitably have 
a negative influence on creating places for daily users and their typical behaviors. According to this 
civic and urban design principles should also be taken into account. Experimental design for 
terrorism resilient cities aims to balance those design principles. Starting with finding common 
features for all three (table 71;72; 73; 74; 75; 76). 
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Table 71 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
Element CPTED goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
Limited entry and 
exit ways 
According to 
CPTED strategies, 
there is no limitation 
in number of exit 
and entry points. 
Though, it suggests 
special design for 
doorways. For 
instance: appropriate 
lightings, monitoring 
with CCTV cameras 
and etc.  
Limited entry and 
exit points to and 
from the site will 
ensure monitoring 
potential 
criminals.  
It can have a 
negative impact 
on accessing the 
site by both 
pedestrians and 
vehicles. 
In a district scale, 
experimental project strategy 
is to clearly distinguish entry 
and exit points, abolish some 
unused streets for traffic 
flows while opening them up 
for public realm. 
Redistribution of 
many same 
functional 
buildings 
N/A Governmental 
districts, cultural 
districts etc.  can 
turn into an easy 
target for terrorist 
organization, as 
far as same 
functional 
buildings are 
redistributed in 
the same area. 
Redistribution of 
many same 
functional 
buildings in the 
site, makes it 
easier and clear 
for visitors to use 
the space. 
Same functional 
building 
concentrated only 
on one space, may 
create identity for 
the area itself. 
Experimental project will 
disperse the importance of 
existing program on the site.  
It will abolish outdoor trade 
next to railway station and 
will create alternative and 
appropriate places for 
weekend market, away from 
railway station in a 
residential zone. 
Clearly defined 
access to private 
and public space 
“Natural access 
control is one of the 
CPTED strategies. It 
is accomplished by 
the design of streets, 
sidewalks,  
building entrances, 
and neighborhood 
gateways to mark 
public  
routes, and by use of 
architectural and 
landscape structural 
elements  
to discourage access 
to private areas. So 
as to be visually 
different from open 
public space access” 
(FEMA 430) .  
Finishes and 
signage should be 
designed for 
visual simplicity. 
N/A Experimental design has no 
specific implementation of 
this principle. Private 
properties in this case, 
community housing has 
controlled entrances inside 
courtyards and the building 
itself with reinforced doors. 
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Table 72 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
 
 
Element CPTED design goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
well used site 
well-used and well-
maintained streets 
and sidewalks 
are safer compared 
to empty spaces. 
Both natural 
surveillance and 
territoriality can be 
achieved by 
promoting more 
activities in public 
spaces. (Jane Jacobs 
1961) 
Well used site 
means it has 
many visitors. 
Crowded places 
are always hard to 
control, 
consequently this 
circumstance can 
turn it into an 
unsafe place and 
an attractive 
target for 
terrorists.   
 
One of the main 
objectives of 
urban design is to 
turn places into an 
attenable and 
well-used spots 
for locals as well 
as for site visitors.  
 
As far as, Railway station 
plaza and surrounded 
territory is reloaded with 
multiple activities, whereas 
in fact parallel streets is 
being used just by residents, 
experimental design proposes 
to create interesting spots in 
surrounding territories as 
well, while abolish some 
activities such as outdoor 
trade next to railway station 
plaza and underground 
pathing’s. 
Direct access to 
the city center 
N/A When site has a 
direct access to 
the city center or 
located in the city 
center, its 
valuable 
properties are 
higher.  
Site that has a 
direct access to 
the city center, 
could be easier 
for terrorists to 
plan their attacks. 
Site, having a 
flexible 
connection to city 
center leads to 
well-used and 
attend able places. 
This recommendation could 
be considered while 
designing new building, in 
this case, only consideration 
in experimental project could 
be controlling vehicle access 
points to and from the site. 
Separated public 
and private 
activities 
All areas are 
designated as either 
public, semi-private 
or private. This 
designation defines 
the acceptable use of 
each zone and 
determines who has 
a right to occupy it 
under certain 
circumstances. 
(Security 
management 
magazine 1981) 
 
Accesses to 
public and private 
buildings should 
be defined. 
However, 
research findings 
have shown that, 
when activities 
are separated 
chance of an 
attack is high.  
Private areas 
should be defined 
by small fences 
and site 
boundaries 
Experimental design will 
suggest semi-private 
transitional zones from 
public to private spaces. For 
instance, new residential 
housing complex will 
suggest services for its 
residents as well as site users. 
Same can be said about 
reconstructed new office 
building ground floor that 
will be open for public uses.  
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Table 73 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Element CPTED design goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
Site location on 
globally 
integrated streets. 
 “Properties on 
development with 
high levels of 
connectivity through 
movement, 
experience more 
crime.” (Bevis and 
Nutter 1977; 
Rubenstein et al 
1980; Taylor and 
Gottfredson 1987 
Van der Voordt and 
Van Wegen 1990; 
White 1990; Poyner 
and Webb 1991; 
Beavon et al 1994; 
Mirlees-Black et al 
1998; Rengert and 
Hakim 1998; Hakim 
et al 2001; Taylor 
2002; Nubani and 
Wineman 2005; 
Yang 2006; 
Armitage 2006; 
Armitage et al 2010) 
 
Site location on 
globally 
integrated streets 
with a lot of 
connector roads 
may turn it into a 
vulnerable target 
for upcoming 
terror attacks. 
“The route should 
be integrated 
within the urban 
fabric so that a  
sense of place is 
maintained and to 
prevent  
severance 
between adjoining 
areas.” (The 
Design Manual 
for Urban Roads 
& Street, 2013) 
Disconnected some roads 
from k. Tamar str. Closing 
them for vehicles and turning 
them to pedestrian roads. 
Same actions should be done 
on Dadiani str. 
Minimalized 
vehicle access 
points to the 
building 
One entrance is 
acceptable, but 
blocking exits is 
impermissible due to 
fire safety or other 
issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preferred to be 
limited both entry 
and exit ways to 
better screen for 
terrorists 
Limited entry and 
exit ways can 
cause devaluation 
of a particular 
areas 
Entry and exit points should 
be clearly defined and 
controlled with continuing 
surveillance (CCTV 
cameras). 
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Table 74 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
 
 
Element CPTED design goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
Direct access to 
the main street 
Site location on main 
street rises its 
valuable properties 
and importance 
among site visitors. 
Direct access to 
the main street 
can raise the risk 
of terror attacks.  
(This principle 
can be considered 
in initial projects) 
Site located on 
the main street 
guarantees its 
potential 
developments and 
capacity of the 
area. 
Disconnecting K. Tamar 
street that has a direct access 
to the railway station plaza 
from the site.   
Bollards 
Neighborhood 
ownership; 
Barrier for visual 
permeability; 
Protects pedestrians 
from cars; 
Ensures security 
of a territory; 
Increase a 
standoff distance; 
protects 
pedestrians and 
important 
facilities from 
direct vehicular 
penetration. 
Right selection of 
bollards, 
reflecting 
characteristic 
feature of an area;  
Can have multiple 
uses other than 
ensuring security 
level;   
Creating own bollard design 
for using as a bench;  
Using bollards for blocking 
traffic flows on streets that 
has been proposed to be 
closed for cars; 
Using bollards to distinguish 
pedestrian lines from traffic 
lines in a high-speed area; 
Planting 
It shows the 
ownership on a 
particular territory.  
Acts like a natural 
fence.  
Guides visitors to 
desired entrances 
and away from 
private areas. 
(General guideline 
for designing safer 
community January 
20, 2000) 
High trees may 
remove the ability of 
natural surveillance 
from lower levels of 
the building; 
Planting can act 
like a barrier 
prevent potential 
criminals from 
obtaining  
intelligence to aid 
their attack 
planning (Wilbur 
l. Peart 2010, 
p14) 
Planting, 
especially trees 
can increase a 
standoff distance 
for vulnerable 
building. 
 
Trees make great 
cities because a 
dynamic  
urban forest 
supports a healthy 
community, 
economy, and    
environment; 
Planting is an 
easy and 
affordable tool for 
creating sense of 
public space and 
community; 
Trees create 
walkable streets, 
Planting can be an 
important element 
in design; 
 
Using trees as an invisible 
barrier distinguishing 
pedestrian flows from high 
speed traffic; 
Using plantings of creating a 
desirable plaza for public 
next to the Railway station 
building; 
(Give place back to people) 
Using plantings for 
improving ecological 
situation, and health for 
Vagzali square communities; 
Use planting without 
blocking the views for 
natural surveillance; 
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Table 75 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
 
Element CPTED design goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
Street furniture 
“It must be made of 
vandal resistant 
material; 
It can be used to 
avoid hidden places 
close to paths and 
hidden corners, blind 
spots or bends that 
create places that 
prevent natural 
surveillance and 
limit choices” 
(CPTED, guidelines 
for Queensland 
2007). 
It can act like a 
barrier, 
prohibiting 
vehicles from 
direct penetration 
to the building. 
“It reveals a 
desire for 
harmony, 
heterogeneity and 
belonging.  
Street furniture 
are objects that 
make the lives of 
citizen easier and 
more beautiful” 
(Blerot, 2013). 
Street furniture 
can equip public 
places like so, to 
turn them into 
more desirable 
places to spend 
time. 
Using street furniture, 
benches, lightnings and etc. 
for equipping site in order to 
create an interesting and 
desirable security zone, 
combined with public uses.  
Increase security level 
around vulnerable target, in 
this case, Tbilisi central 
railway station by designing 
street furniture, that reveals 
site character respectively. 
Moat 
it is traditional 
environmental 
design element, that 
is presented with 
water features, it can 
increase the number 
of activities on the 
site so as natural 
surveillance. 
Increase standoff 
distance; 
Moats can create 
an interesting and 
characteristic 
element in urban 
forms. 
Moat can 
sometimes act 
like a barrier, 
distinguishing 
places from each 
other.   
Implementing water elements 
into designing railway station 
plaza, that on one hand will 
act like a moat and a barrier 
for traffic. On another hand, 
it will improve the quality of 
recreation that will be offered 
by newly formed plaza. 
Control points 
Defines the 
ownership; 
Gives information 
about the place, how 
long can visitors stay 
there, what activities 
are allowed an etc. 
Used to screen 
visitors in order to 
identify potential 
aggressors. 
People start 
behaving 
differently when 
they are screened 
and controlled.   
Using control points only in 
most necessary areas, such 
are railway station car access 
points and proposed 
multistory parking building 
next to railway station.   
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Table 76 CPTED, anti-terrorism design, urban and civic design principles optimization for design. 
Element CPTED design goal 
Anti-terrorism 
design goal 
Urban planning 
and civic design 
goal 
Ways of implementing in 
Tbilisi railway station 
design 
Plaza 
 
Plazas can be 
detrimental to 
CPTED “if poorly 
maintained and 
accessed, but if 
outfitted well can be 
assets that serve to 
attract people and 
increase natural 
surveillance and 
better delineate 
between public and 
private space.” 
(Rothrock, 
2010).  
Site surrounded 
by an open space 
can turn it into a 
vulnerable target 
for terror attacks. 
However, 
building requires 
open space for 
increased standoff 
zone.   
If plazas are 
equipped with 
adequate urban 
and design 
elements they can 
be a determinant 
factor of 
increasing 
standoff distance. 
Creating plazas in 
front of buildings 
can rise the 
importance of the 
building itself. (A 
good example 
here could be 
SEAGRAM 
building in New 
York, After 
designing plaza 
for public realm, 
building and 
surrounding 
territory has 
become more 
important for 
civilian than in 
was before). 
Well-designed plaza next to 
railway station, considering 
both urban design and anti-
terrorism design principles. 
Attracting people and at the 
same time preventing any 
criminal activities on the site 
with help of natural and 
continues surveillance. 
 
Wide sidewalks 
Creates more 
inviting environment 
for more pedestrian 
actions;  
Makes “Eyes on the 
street” theory more 
possible; 
 
Increases a 
standoff distance; 
Decreases a 
chance of high 
speed vehicles 
direct access to 
vulnerable targets. 
 
Wide sidewalks 
enable streets to 
be designed like 
so to encourage 
pedestrian 
walking; 
“The importance 
of pedestrian 
public  
spaces cannot be 
measured, but 
most  
other important 
things in life 
cannot be  
measured 
either...pedestrian 
places are  
essential to a 
city’s happiness” 
(Penalosa 2011). 
According to the fact that 
major core pedestrian roads 
on thesis site are occupied by 
traders, design will suggest 
to turn them into walkable 
areas by widening sidewalks 
and suggesting trader’s 
alternative places for selling 
their products.  
Equipping sidewalks with 
security elements for 
decreasing the chance of 
vehicle access to pedestrian 
lane. 
125 
 
 
 
3.3.2.  Main Conceptual approach and strategies 
 
Considering above mentioned anti-terrorism design, urban/civic design and CPTED principles with 
the background of thesis research recommendations as well as literature review, a new approach to 
the site reconstruction has been developed.  
First thing that design suggests, is to organize trade. Abolishing illegal outdoor trades from 
pedestrian underground and over ground passing’s. The main intention of this action is to get rid of 
uncontrolled activities and undesirable flows on the site. Thesis stated that above mentioned 
activities make site more vulnerable.  Alternatively, new organized open-air trade (that will be 
functioning during weekends and the rest of the week it will serve community as a park and 
recreational zone) will be designed inside the community on an empty plot (currently used as a 
temporary parking) (Figure 33). This experimental design decision, is also associated with the 
research findings that many same functional building redistributions in a surrounding area, turns the 
site more vulnerable. According to this, new design tries to make shopping destinations in the site 
more clustered, than it was before, when site was accommodating: Illegal underground, illegal over 
ground, Community market and shopping malls.  
New design also solves parking problems, by creating multi-story parking building next to the 
central station. Location of parking building will determine its primary purpose, to serve only 
railway station visitors as well as employees in the building. New parking building will be equipped 
with devices for continuing surveillance, as well as, entrance and exit barriers (figure 34). 
Another new building that will be added on the site is a residential building. It will be constructed in 
place of old shopping mall “Детский мир”, that has been burnt down in 2017. Original building is 
going to be demolished as far as construction has been damaged significantly that makes it 
impossible to be repaired (Source: Georgian Union of Architects). Residential building, will be a 
guarantee of a natural surveillance on railway station and newly created public plaza (figure 34). 
In search of increasing natural surveillance, new office building has been designed inside existing 
abandoned building, originally built for Railway station co-workers. (As far as all offices has been 
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moved in a new railway station, building has become abandoned) with multifunctional welcoming 
ground floor offering spaces for co-working environment. 
Experimental project also suggests reconstruction of a community market hall in order to regain its 
popularity. It is an undeniable fact that, after abolishing illegal trade. Site will need an alternative 
solution. 
Figure 34 New program for site redevelopment. Illustration prepared by author 
Turning into the plaza, that is planned to be organized in front of a railway station building, will be 
divided into two: Static public plaza, (figure 35) and dynamic public plaza (Figure 36) for 
organizing special events.  
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Figure 35 Static public plaza. Illustration prepared by author 
Static public plaza is reloaded with recreational spots, children-friendly parks, outdoor community 
shopping spaces, eating spots and etc. As for plaza behind a central station, accommodates public 
transport platforms with multiple bus stops as well as a park for commuters (during waiting times). 
Static plaza, in this case will work as a security zone, at the same time, it will be a desirable space 
for public realm. In addition to that plaza will extend the distance between vulnerable building and 
potential threat (in this case vehicles) 
Turning into dynamic plaza, that provides various activities to site users, can be considered as the 
most vulnerable spot in a new design. According to its vulnerability, experimental project suggests 
controlled exit and entry points, that can be accomplished by existed staircases designed for 
underground passing’s (figure 36).  
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Events that plaza could offer for its users, could be following. During spring: Open air museum 
days, music festivals or other events organized by city government. During summer: plaza can offer 
free gym days to citizens, the rest of the days it can turn into a rest zone for community. As for 
Autumn, dynamic plazas can community market in weekends or open-air cinemas. During winter 
time, here could be organized some events concerts or even ice skating rink. This dynamic 
characteristic feature of new plazas will ensure its actuality among citizens as well as site visitors.  
  Entry point                     Exit point 
Figure 36 Underground passing’s as Dynamic public plazas. Illustration prepared by author  
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3.3.3. Design Process and justification of design solutions 
 
After analyzing site by means of its usability, accessibility (mobility), actuality and etc. Design main 
goal become to redistribute importance of particular functions to be spread into a larger scale, so as 
not to make transportation hub a vulnerable target for terror attacks. In search of accomplishing 
main goal of design with a minimum impact of already planned built environment, various 
implementations have been done according to conceptual model described in a previous 
subparagraph.  
Starting with a minimal change on a street infrastructure. Green lines have been added in almost all 
major streets, as well as, an appropriate street lighting for better scanning vehicles during late hours. 
In some places, pedestrian lanes as well as green lanes have become wider and more intense, 
ensuring natural surveillance on streets (figure 37).  
Figure 37 Road section example with extended green line, after abolishing single vehicle line. Illustration 
prepared by author 
In K. Tamar street that can be understood as the major infrastructural core for the site, it was 
impossible to abolish vehicle lane, however design suggested to diminish vehicle lane width from 3. 
8 m to 3.2 meters, resulting continues green lane and slightly wider pedestrian lanes, that on itself is 
equipped with road barrier elements (Planting pots used as a bollards) (Figure 38)  
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As for streets, that have been abolished 
after considering its importance and the 
extant of usage by vehicles and 
pedestrians, has turned into a liner 
boulevards that serves community 
demands (recreation and activity plazas). 
Those roads are separated from active 
roads with bollard system that can be 
used as a bench and a planting pots for 
community purposes (Figure 39). 
Figure 38 K. Tamar str. Illustration prepared by author 
Vehicles in anti-terrorism design, can be understood as a potential threat, that need to be organized 
in a special manner. (With controlled 
barriers, checking points and continues as 
well as natural surveillance is highly 
required.)  
Problems of parking lot organization in 
central Railway station territory, has 
highlighted the necessity of multistory 
parking. It will serve visitors of a railway 
station, as well as its employees (figure 
40). All cars entering and exiting the site 
will be scanned with CCTV cameras. 
This will diminish possibility of any 
potential threats.  
 
Figure 39 Community boulevards instead of 
vehicle roads. Illustration prepared by author. 
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Figure 40 New parking lot next to the railway station.  
Turning into a justification of new housing unit’s suggestion on the site, the decision was made after 
a fire accident that caused a complete destruction of original building (shopping mall) (figure 41).
 
Figure 41 Original building in a Central Station site after fire accident. Photo taken by author in 2017, 
February  
The accident had a significant economic impact on civilians. According to this fact decision was 
made to devalue important transportation hub and its surrounding site and suggest housing unit 
instead of another shopping center, with welcoming ground floors. Housing unit location, will 
enable its residents to keep an eye on railway station plaza as well as their courtyards. (With 
consideration of CPTED strategies). In addition to this, private entrances and exits to and from the 
residential complex are strongly defined (figure 42, figure 44). 
Same approach has been implemented into an abandoned building, situated next to railway station 
(figure 43). Experimental design suggests to organize less vulnerable activities on the ground floor. 
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Activities include: Supermarket, co-working spaces, beauty salon, gym and etc. (figure 43). Private 
and public entrances and exits are separated.  
The main aim of designing new, less vulnerable objects is to devalue site importance and diminish 
site visitors number.  
 
Figure 42 Housing complex ground floor plan                  Figure 43 Office building ground floor plan 
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Figure 44 New housing units, reconstructed office building and surrounding site reinforcement. Illustration 
prepared by author 
In order to redistribute importance of the site, some shopping destinations has been spread into 
residential zones. Design suggests a weekend community outdoor trade while in other days’ area 
will be used as a park for inhabitants (figure 45). Experimental design intends, that a temporary 
activity on the site will make the territory easier to be controlled with both natural as well as 
continues surveillance. In addition to that new outdoor trade will bring people from railway station 
to districts. This circumstance will lead to realization of research project 2 strategy: 
‘…Redistribution of importance of buildings’.  
Another aspect that design considers is using existing layout of trade. More precisely reverting 
importance of community market. Illegal trades on the site was acting like a barrier serving 
customers directly in front of metro entrances and public transport stations. Consequently, legal 
community market building was not used adequately. However, after banning shopping on the 
streets design intends that market building will have more visitors. According to this design 
comprised reconstruction procedure of old building and turn it into more desirable shopping venue 
than it was before. 
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Figure 45 Community outdoor market. Illustration prepared by author 
Radical changes have been done in organizing plazas around station building. Design uses plaza for 
ensuring security zone of potential terrorist target object.  As has been mentioned in a previous 
paragraph plaza suggests various activities to its users. In addition to that plaza is organized like so 
that it provides a clear vehicular entry and exit points to and from the site, that on itself has been 
diminished in number and now it is presented with 2 entry points and 2 exit points from where 1 
entry and 1 exit point serves only public transport cars. (figure 46) Design elements: mound, trees 
and plantings, Bollards, stairs and ramps are used as a protection elements for the station building. 
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Figure 46 Overall expression of experimental design implementation. Illustration prepared by author  
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3.3.4. Suggestion for surrounding land use development and changes in zoning plane 
 
In the end of experimental design project of urban planning and design for terrorism resilient cities, 
it is relevant to compare existing land use to a proposed land use plan and predict the development 
strategies of an area, surrounds vulnerable transportation hub. As it is illustrated by figure 46 
considering security design principles does not have a dramatic impact of site’s  
 
Figure 47 Existing and proposed land uses comparison for experimental design site. Illustration prepared by 
author 
current situation (figure 47). Although, new public plaza is turning medium intensity 
commercial zone into general public open space. Transportation zone has been diminished after 
design proposal of new office building, instead of old railway station office building. In addition 
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to this, community market reconstruction, caused to turn existing zone into a high intensity 
commercial mixed use zone (previously, zone was included into transportation zone as the 
building was originally built as a Borjomi railway station). However, multistory parking building 
has turned low density residential zone into transportation zone, presented with general public 
open space.  
As for some streets that were closed for vehicles, conferred to general public open space. 
Organizing platform for public transport users behind railway station building, has clearly 
outlined generic public open space zone as well. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Main objectives and tasks of experimental design was to test urban forms, elements and other 
recommendations, in order to rise security level at Tbilisi central railway station site. In addition to 
that, experimental design considers existing, already planned community context and historical 
urban layout. It is strongly believed that, while designing new, existing should be maintained and 
preserved.  However, during design process, it has been outlined that “there is no one-size-fits-all 
rule that will provide a high level of security for every project site” (Droge and Hopper, 2005). Even 
though, there is no ‘one size fit solution’ for all sites, findings of anti-terrorism design principles and 
implementation in real problematic urban environment, gave general recommendations on how to 
rise security level, while protecting and maintaining the image and distinctive character of the area 
• For elements of site reorganization, design suggested minimalizing vehicular accesses to and from 
the site by two different ways. Firstly, abolishing some roads by disconnection secondary roads 
from major streets. Design intends that it will lead to less integrated, so as less vulnerable roads and 
places respectively. Although, it was impossible to make radical changes in Tbilisi infrastructural 
network, while working on a small site and not on a whole city. For future design projects, 
experimental design recommends considering the whole cities transportation network and change 
road system with larger scale implementations. Abolishing some roads, will turn railway station 
building relatively hard to be accessed by vehicle, especially without going through the checking 
points or without scanning by CCTV cameras. New multi-story parking building will ensure 
regulating chaos, caused by private cars. New residential building as an addition of a site 
composition, will ensure safe activities in the perimeter, as well as make Jacobs ‘eyes on the street’ 
theory possible.  
• As an initially conclusion can be said that, site analysis has highlighted complexity of Tbilisi central 
station and its surrounding territory, by means of public transport diversity presented on both sides 
of Railway tracks, as well as different kinds of zones redistributed on the site (residential, 
commercial, transportation and industrial zones and etc.). In this chapter necessity of public open 
space has been highlighted (small territory of greenery not sufficient for community purposes, as 
well as for site visitors). Irregulated parking lots, easy vehicular access to and from the site, turning 
it into less terrorism resistant place. Same can be said about multiple legal or illegal shopping 
destinations, causing higher concentration of users in particular spots. Even though site has a lot of 
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users, there is still a lack of urban life. Site function is only oriented on transportation and trade, 
whereas in fact no entertainment is offered for people who are actually living there.  
• Turning into strategies and conceptual approaches, formed after analysing the site and considering 
environmental elements, highlighted in a chapter 2. Experimental model, tried to redistribute values 
of the place and spread it farther from a station building.  
For instance, design suggests alternative weekend community trade in the heart of residential 
district. This will therefore ‘devalue’ central railway station and its surrounding territory and will 
inevitable transfer concentration of people inside districts. In addition to that, abolishing illegal trade 
and giving back the importance of original community market building, will regulate ways of using 
site adequately and in a right manner.  
Site analyses has also outlined the issue of irregulated parking lots on the site, that hard to be 
controlled either by natural or continues surveillance. Solution, that experimental design suggests, is 
a new multistory parking for railway station visitors and its employees. This approach, can be 
understood as an alternative way of how to increase security in vulnerable major buildings, by 
isolating them from high risk urban areas. In this case, experimental design proposes a partly 
isolating parking from railway station and putting it into highly controlled multi-story parking 
building. 
As for public transport, design solves the problem of disorderly distributed various means of public 
transportation, by concentrating them on one spot. This will lead to clearly defined space for mini 
buses and public buses. Controlling exit and entry points for public transport, will ensure safety of 
passengers as well as site users.  
Apart from increasing standoff distance of central station, plaza has a strong social value. Dynamic 
public plazas offering various sessional community activates, that on itself will bring the community 
together. As for static public plaza with recreations, cafes and rest areas will act similarly as 
dynamic public plaza.   
• There were number of environmental design solutions and recommendations for anti-terrorism 
design, formed by empirical research. Solutions, have been used to be implemented in experimental 
design. For instance: 
‘Redistribution of same functional buildings in a small territory, will lead to terror attack’ 
recommendation, implemented into redistribution of trade. Resulting reloading district importance 
and devaluing particular areas.  
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‘Minimalizing vehicle access point to the building.’ While transforming transportation zone into 
recreational zone, lot of streets, that has a direct access to railway station building, automatically 
abolished. Remaining only 2 Entry and 2 exit points that are strongly defined and controlled.  
‘Site has a direct access to the main street will lead to terror attack’, even though K. Tamar street 
was disconnected from plaza, this strategy has not fully accomplished by experimental design. As 
for, disconnected railway plaza from C. Dadianis street that is the most integrated road on the site 
was impossible.  
‘Separating public and private activities’ in experimental design public activities, in this case 
residential courtyards and apartment buildings are functioning separately, isolated from public 
spaces with gates, bushes and etc.  
‘Well used site’, experimental projects suggest territory to be well used, by creating multifunctional 
plazas. Regulated functions on site, will therefore guarantees correct usage of spaces by civilians. 
‘Direct access to the city center’, as has been decided in the beginning of formatting conceptual 
model, this environmental feature is hard to be achieved in already planned road network. However, 
after abolishing few streets on the site, city center has turned into slightly less accessible place from 
Central station site.  
• Experimental design used Jacobs ‘eye on the street’ theory. According to this theory, for increasing 
natural surveillance on plaza, new residential apartment building has been proposed on an empty 
plot. Experimental design also suggested reconstruction of existing office building for increasing 
natural surveillance on the site. All above mentioned strategies, has been implemented in a 
problematic area of Tbilisi, rising security level on the site with appropriate design elements, 
invisible to public eyes.  
It is relevant to mention experimental design process weaknesses. As has been mentioned before, 
different sites need different approaches. Design process has shown that some research aspects are 
unsuitable for particular cases. In addition to that, it is almost impossible to predict, weather 
proposed design will work in that particular cases or not. Another drawback of experimental design 
could be chosen site complexity and functional diversity, proposed by the area that arises other 
problems as well.  
 
 
 
 
141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WHOLE WORK CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
1) Starting with defining most vulnerable target objects for terror attacks. Despite the fact that, at first glance 
terrorist organization randomly select sites and objects for fulfilling their political or religious ambitious, in 
reality, thesis work showed that target object selection is a tactic process, carried out by terrorist 
organizations, comprises foreseeing in advance success rate of an attack, determined by a particular area, a 
possible number of causalities, as well as, the possibility to access selected territory without any 
complications. In accordance with literature review, architectural objects and urban sites can be classified as 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ targets. Generally, terrorists avoid attacking ‘hard’ targets such are: governmental buildings, 
nuclear power plants, foreign embassies, military headquarters and etc. As for ‘soft’ targets, historically 
major cities were attractive venues for terrorists and aggressors, nowadays crowded, public places have 
turned unsecured. Although, this thesis case studies have outlined, that terrorists avoid ‘hard’ targets, is only 
a widely accepted stereotype. However, in reality, any major places, that could be foreseen as a well-used site 
(with political, religious, cultural, touristic and etc. values), can be expected as a potential and an attractive 
venue for terror attacks. 
2) Turning into Empirical research, for identifying environmental design features, that turned out to have a 
momentous importance for anti-terrorism design studies. It has been proved by thesis, that uncontrolled entry 
and exit points to and from the site will ensure its reinforcement. According to the fact that vehicle is 
understood as a potential threat, it appeared that diminishing vehicular access to the building will decrease its 
vulnerability rate as well. Even though, planners aim is to create spaces that will be used by civilians, thesis 
pointed out that well-used sites can turn into attractive target for terrorists. The chance of terror attacks is 
relatively high, when private activities are strongly separated from public activities. Even though FEMA 
guidelines suggest redistribution same functional vulnerable buildings together in order to increase standoff 
distance, research findings clarified Augurs idea of dispersing major infrastructural cores in the city (Augur, 
1948). It turned out that, there is a medium chance of attack if same functional buildings are redistributed in a 
surrounding area. In addition to this, it is important to clearly define accesses to private and public spaces. 
Research also proved that site, with direct access to the main street, as well as to the city center, can be turned 
into attractive target for terrorists. The importance of standoff distance has also been outlined by research. 
Furthermore, presence of medical institutions on the site as well as security forces may elude possible attack. 
According to prognoses, the chance of attack in this case is relatively low.  
3) As for investigating spatial urban structure, thesis conclude that streets with high global integration values are 
more likely turning into venues for terror attacks. Accordingly, in order to transcend vulnerability, it is 
important to organize road network in a complex way, in search of decreasing chances of an easy access to 
potential target objects of the city. This finding could be associated with planning strategies for medieval 
towns, irregular planning and dispersing facilities to confuse enemies (Gutjahr,1999).   
4) Thesis initial suggestion on cooperation between anti-terrorism, CPTED, civic and urban design principles 
have concluded that anti-terrorism design findings can be humanized. To give an illustration on refining 
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holistic anti-terrorism architecture, we can start with the idea that entry and exit ways can be limited by 
disconnecting some vehicular secondary streets from vulnerable targets. Instead of minimalizing vehicular 
access points to the building, thesis proposes to use London ‘ring of the steel’ strategy and control all exit and 
entry ways with CCTV cameras, as well as with natural surveillance (residents, site users and in some case 
police force). Even though well-used sites are attractive targets for terrorists, considering placemaking 
principles, thesis proposes to regulate interesting activities on station plazas, instead of abolishing them 
(prohibiting temporary parking, illegal trade and etc.) and create interesting spots in a surrounding territory, 
using space accordingly, by loading with various safe activities is a key principle of 1st generation CPTED as 
well. With regards to separation between public and private activities, thesis suggest creating semi-private 
transitional zones that will be foreseen for specific groups as well as for site users. In order to humanize 
principle of avoiding redistribution same functional buildings in the surrounding area, thesis suggests to 
disperse the importance of existing program on the site (by moving outdoor trades far away from a station 
building). As for humanizing principle of clear definition of access to private and public spaces, thesis has no 
specific suggestion as far as entrances to private properties (residential houses) on proposed site are already 
protected with fences or gates. According to the fact that direct access to the city center and to the main street 
increases site’s importance and chances of an attack, for refining strategy, design suggested isolated site plaza 
from major street (K.Tamar street). However, in most cases this strategy is impossible to be fulfilled. Turning 
into site location on globally integrated street practice, thesis work highlights the importance of closing some 
secondary streets for vehicular flow, consequently, disconnected from major roads that will therefore 
decrease its global integration value and at the same time will assists the idea of ‘invisible’ security. 
5) From the outcome of experimental design investigation, it is possible to conclude that the main concern of 
hiding security planning strategies behind aesthetically pleasant or ‘invisible ‘design elements is feasible to 
be achieved to some extent. According to experimental design, Tbilisi central railway station site has been 
foreseen as potential terrorist targets. Identifying district working mechanism, its characteristics and basic 
functions that inevitable need to be maintained, led to minimal implementations in already built environment. 
It is a significant fact to be mentioned that area required strong functional reclassification, for security design 
interventions, organize safe activities in unsafe locations and unsafe activities in safe locations. Design has 
not damaged its distinctive characteristics, moreover it emphasized site basic functions: transportation, 
shopping, living and leisure (however, in a more organized way). Plazas surrounding station building, have 2 
ideological and functional loads. From placemaking point of view, it tried to meet site permanent and 
temporary users demands by offering various activities inside a strongly defined borders. As for anti-
terrorism design strategies, it extends distance between vulnerable object and vehicles (2nd layer of defense) 
and gives opportunity to reinforce territory by various ‘invisible’ anti-terrorism elements, disposed around 
station building (trees, planters, bollards, street furniture and etc.). As for new residential building and office 
building, except its basic function, its users will ensure natural surveillance on vulnerable territory. 
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Consequently, it will be associated with social context that had been outlined by civic design principles as 
well as 2nd Generation of CPTED.  
To be short, anti-terrorism ‘four Ds’ strategy have been accomplished in a following way (Table 6) 
Deter Detect Deny Devalue 
Creating plaza for 
increasing stand-off 
distance, reinforcing 
territory with mound, 
trees, Bushes and etc.   
CCTV cameras, natural 
surveillance provided 
by residents and 
workers form office 
building.  
N/A Redistributing site 
functions in safer 
zones: relocating 
outdoor trade in a 
residential zone 
 Table 6 Organized design solutions by means of anti-terrorism design ‘four Ds’ strategy 
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SUMMARY 
Thesis was composed of three chapters, each chapter used different methodology and tools for 
addressing the issue of urban planning and design for terrorism resilient cities. Literature review, 
field research and experimental design had proceeded to answer thesis main questions. 
literature review focused on four environmental design principles: anti-terrorism design, CPTED, 
urban and civic design. Anti-terrorism design had highlighted four main strategies (‘four Ds’): deter, 
detect, deny and devalue. For humanizing holistic anti-terrorism design architectural and urban 
principles, thesis also considered rest three design strategies. In the end of the chapter a hypothetical 
model had been built. Accordingly, thesis work was able to go forward.  
Two completely independent field researches had carried out in order to test thesis hypothesis and 
answer its main question. First part of a research, identified environmental design factors that 
influence choice of places for terror attacks, as for second part, it identified spatial urban structure 
that influenced choosing specific areas for an attack while avoiding others. For accomplishing first 
part of a research, ‘Yes/No’ questioner had developed based on CPTED checklist and FEMA 
guidelines for anti-terrorism design strategies, as well as considered hypothetical model principles. 
Google earth streets views for 14 sites with recent terror attacks and 21 sites without terror attacks 
have been assessed with ‘Yes/No ‘questioner. Later on, correlation and liner regression analyses had 
processed, leading to discovery of 9 major environmental elements that had a strong correlation with 
terror attacks, finishing with descriptive statistics, that outlines 12 major environmental elements. As 
for second part of a research, it carried out for investigation spatial urban structures by syntactical 
analyses of 6 sites (analysing major space attributes: connectivity, mean depth, integration and 
choice values), affected by terror attacks.  
The final stage for composing a thesis work was testing findings reasonableness by implementing 
strategies developed by previous researches into real problematic urban area. Initially, a vulnerable 
146 
 
target object had been selected with space syntax method. Considering sites complexity, a 
conceptual model had been built, adjusted to site characteristics. Apart from dealing with site 
vulnerability problems, for ‘hiding’ hostile anti-terrorism design elements behind aesthetically 
pleasant design, other issues, such are: mobility, urban life, shopping, living and etc. had also taken 
into account.  
Thesis finished with main work conclusions answering thesis main tasks.  
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ANNEXIES 
 
Variable 8 and Variable 40  
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00008 Between Groups (Combined) 1,313 1 1,313 6,000 ,021 
Within Groups 5,688 26 ,219   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00008 cannot be computed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5,250a 1 ,022   
Continuity Correctionb 3,646 1 ,056   
Likelihood Ratio 5,445 1 ,020   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,054 ,027 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5,063 1 ,024   
N of Valid Cases 28     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00008 ,433 ,188 
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Variable 28 and Variable 40 
 
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00028 Between Groups (Combined) 1,522 1 1,522 7,222 ,012 
Within Groups 5,478 26 ,211   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00028 cannot be computed. 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00028 ,466 ,217 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6,087a 1 ,014   
Continuity Correctionb 3,896 1 ,048   
Likelihood Ratio 8,027 1 ,005   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,041 ,020 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5,870 1 ,015   
N of Valid Cases 28     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Variable 30 and Variable 40 
 
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00030 Between Groups (Combined) 1,023 1 1,023 4,452 ,045 
Within Groups 5,977 26 ,230   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00030 cannot be computed. 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00030 ,382 ,146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,094a 1 ,043   
Continuity Correctionb 2,620 1 ,106   
Likelihood Ratio 4,273 1 ,039   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,103 ,052 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3,947 1 ,047   
N of Valid Cases 28     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
158 
 
Variable 32 and Variable 40 
 
 
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00034 Between Groups (Combined) 1,522 1 1,522 7,222 ,012 
Within Groups 5,478 26 ,211   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00034 cannot be computed. 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00034 ,466 ,217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.300 1 ,012   
Continuity Correctionb 4,375 1 ,036   
Likelihood Ratio 6890 1 ,009   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,033 ,016 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.075 1 ,014   
N of Valid Cases 28     
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Variable 34 and Variable 40 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00034 ,466 ,217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00034 Between Groups (Combined) 1,522 1 1,522 7,222 ,012 
Within Groups 5,478 26 ,211   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00034 cannot be computed. 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.087 1 ,014   
Continuity Correctionb 3,896 1 ,036   
Likelihood Ratio 8,027 1 ,009   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,041 ,020 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5,870 1 ,015   
N of Valid Cases 28     
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Variable 36 and Variable 40 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
VAR00040 * VAR00036 ,512 ,262 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7,337a 1 ,007   
Continuity Correctionb 5,390 1 ,020   
Likelihood Ratio 7,788 1 ,005   
Fisher's Exact Test    ,018 ,009 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7,075 1 ,008   
N of Valid Cases 28     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
ANOVA Tablea 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
VAR00040 * VAR00036 Between Groups (Combined) 1,834 1 1,834 9,232 ,005 
Within Groups 5,166 26 ,199   
Total 7,000 27    
a. With fewer than three groups, linearity measures for VAR00040 * VAR00036 cannot be computed. 
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